Why Another Israeli Strike on Iran Is Unlikely

According to the political desk of Saed News, Javan newspaper reported:

Following the halt of hostilities between Israel and Iran, most speculations suggested that a new round of war between the two sides would soon erupt. However, nearly six months later, although no new war has begun, Israel has continued to use media campaigns to keep the specter of conflict over Iran and to maintain a state of suspended uncertainty regarding developments in the country.

In reality, despite enemy psychological operations and media hype, current facts indicate that the likelihood of a renewed war between Israel and Iran is low.

The main reasons include:

1. Domestic Security Has Historically Been Shielded: In almost every war, Israel’s home front has remained largely protected. The Israeli government and military have prioritized keeping the occupied territories’ residents safe by “bringing the war to the enemy’s territory.” Yet during the 12-day conflict, Iran’s successful attacks exposed the fragility of Israel’s security to its own population. Therefore, Israel would only risk another war if it could ensure effective defense against Iranian attacks—an unlikely prospect given the range, speed, and precision of Iran’s missiles.

2. Iran’s Defensive and Offensive Capabilities Have Grown: Compared to the period before the 12-day war, Iran’s defense capabilities have increased significantly, and its readiness for renewed confrontation is far stronger. This has heightened Israel’s vulnerability to Iran.

3. Air Superiority Is No Longer Guaranteed: Historically, Israel has relied on air superiority. Today, with Iran’s enhanced defensive and offensive capabilities, achieving air dominance as in the 12-day war is no longer feasible. Unlike other battlefields, Iranian missiles can now counter Israel’s aerial attacks—a reality that nearly forced Israeli surrender in 2006, when analysts warned that a two-week extension of the conflict could have led to Israel’s collapse.

4. Social Cohesion Undermines Israel’s Strategy: During the 12-day war, Israel recognized it could not achieve military dominance over Iran and instead sought to exploit internal dissatisfaction to disrupt Iranian defense systems. On the war’s first day, the Israeli prime minister even called on Iranians to incite chaos. Instead, Iranian national unity strengthened, nullifying Israel’s multi-layered strategy. Today, Israel still relies on potential internal disruption in Iran for success—a condition unlikely to materialize given the Iranian people’s political awareness and social cohesion.

5. Regional Constraints Limit Israel: Israel cannot attack Iran until it achieves its objectives in other regional arenas. Lebanon is central; Hezbollah has faced intense pressure to disarm, yet even U.S. special envoys acknowledge that military action alone cannot achieve this. Hezbollah’s rebuilding continues, Iraq’s pro-resistance parties are gaining parliamentary influence, and Hamas in Gaza maintains its stance despite ceasefires. The regional balance of resistance remains intact.

Additionally, growing international cooperation with Iran following the end of hostilities further reduces the chance of renewed conflict. Considering these factors and assuming rational decision-making by key actors, the probability of another war between Israel and Iran is low.

Nonetheless, given the ongoing nature of the Israel-Iran conflict and Israel’s tendency toward surprise tactics, Iran must continue to expand its comprehensive defense capabilities and maintain a high level of readiness to prevent any potential strategic surprise.