SAEDNEWS: At present, three scenarios are unfolding between Iran and the United States, with some experts considering the most dangerous one to be the escalation of the crisis to energy infrastructure.
According to SaedNews’ political service, Alireza Rajaei wrote in Etemad:
The US attack on positions on Lark Island and Iran’s missile response against US positions in Jordan cannot be viewed simply as a limited exchange of fire between the two sides. The real significance of these developments lies in their direct connection to the security of the Strait of Hormuz, freedom of navigation, energy security, and the future of the Persian Gulf’s security order. However, a professional assessment of the incident requires a clear distinction between confirmed facts, claims made by the parties, and strategic analysis.
There are conflicting accounts regarding the exact number of casualties and the extent of the damage, and some figures still require independent verification. Therefore, disputed figures should not be presented as established facts. Regardless of these differences, however, one strategic reality has become clear: Hormuz has evolved from a commercial passageway into one of the most important geopolitical levers in the confrontation between Iran and the United States.
According to the US account, two launchers attributed to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were targeted on Lark Island, with Washington claiming that the equipment was connected to threats involving the deployment of mines in the Strait of Hormuz. Regardless of the extent to which this account is fully accurate, the choice of Lark Island is geographically and strategically significant.
The island lies in an area where any military activity could directly affect the security of maritime traffic through Hormuz. From this perspective, the strike on Lark was not merely the destruction of a military target; it could also signal that Washington considers the security of navigation through Hormuz to be among its operational red lines.
From Iran’s perspective, meanwhile, the incident provides an opportunity to redefine an important message: Iran can distinguish between its “sovereignty and national security” and the “security and freedom of navigation.” This distinction is highly important for gaining regional and international support.
Iran’s missile response against US positions in Jordan can be analyzed within the framework of regional deterrence. Its central message is that a direct attack on Iran could impose costs on the network of US military deployments across the region.
From a diplomatic and persuasive standpoint, however, the significance of Iran’s response lies not only in its military capabilities. To convert military power into political and diplomatic influence, Iran must also communicate that its objective is not to create permanent insecurity in the region.
In other words, Iran’s preferred strategy should place two propositions alongside each other: Iran will defend its security, but it also regards the security of Hormuz as part of the region’s shared security. This could become the most important foundation for persuading regional countries and the international community.
For Iran, Hormuz is not merely a geographic location. It is part of the country’s national security, economy, and geopolitical position. At the same time, turning Hormuz into a permanent instrument of pressure could create costs for Iran itself, ranging from higher insurance and transportation risks to pressure on trade, energy revenues, and economic relations with neighboring countries.
Therefore, Iran’s real power in Hormuz is not limited to its ability to disrupt maritime traffic. Its greater strategic value lies in its ability to transform this position into a sustainable security and economic mechanism.
This is where “deterrence” can become “diplomacy.” Iran could argue that the security of Hormuz should not be a matter of competition among extra-regional powers and that the coastal states of the Persian Gulf should take the leading role in managing regional security.
For many countries in the region, this narrative could be more acceptable than a simple “Iran versus the United States” framework.
Under this scenario, Omani mediation could lead to a temporary understanding aimed at reducing attacks, guaranteeing the passage of commercial vessels, and preventing further escalation.
In such circumstances, Iran could shift the initiative from merely “responding to the crisis” toward proposing mechanisms for managing it.
This scenario remains plausible. Both sides would avoid an all-out war while continuing limited attacks and issuing mutual threats.
The problem for Iran is that even without an official closure of Hormuz, continued insecurity could impose significant economic and political costs. It would therefore be more advantageous for Iran to maintain military deterrence while managing the level of tension.
This is the most dangerous scenario. If attacks spread to oil and gas terminals or other energy infrastructure, the crisis would spill over into global energy markets.
Iran, like other countries in the region, would also face the economic and political consequences.
Even if maritime routes remain open, shipping companies, insurers, and investors will not return to normal operations until the risk environment becomes sustainably lower.
Therefore, if Iran wants to take the initiative from a diplomatic and persuasive standpoint, it must distinguish between reopening the route, securing the route, and restoring confidence in the route.
Three principles could serve as the foundation of such an approach:
Ensuring genuine maritime security;
Establishing a transparent mechanism for managing maritime incidents;
Creating an immediate communication channel among coastal states to prevent misunderstandings and unintended escalation.
Iran could move beyond a purely defensive position and put forward a clear political proposal: the security of Hormuz should be managed with the participation of the coastal states and without the dominance of any single foreign power.
This would not mean eliminating international cooperation. Rather, it would mean shifting the center of gravity of regional security from extra-regional military forces toward the countries of the region.
Under such a model, Iran would play a leading role in coastal and regional security; Oman would serve as a mediator and coordinator; the Gulf’s coastal states would participate in a collective security mechanism; international actors would cooperate in guaranteeing trade and maritime safety; and shipping companies and insurers would participate in assessing and managing risks.
Such a model could transform the security of Hormuz from a purely military issue into a shared security-and-economic concern.
Iran’s most important challenge at this stage is not simply managing the military arena, but also managing the narrative.
If Iran speaks only in terms of threats, closing the route, and military confrontation, part of the international community may accept the US narrative that Iran poses a “threat to freedom of navigation.”
But if Iran simultaneously emphasizes three messages, the strategic landscape could change:
First, Iran considers its right to self-defense non-negotiable.
Second, Iran accepts the security and freedom of navigation within the framework of shared regional rights and interests.
Third, Iran seeks to remove the security of Hormuz from the exclusive control of extra-regional forces and establish a participatory security mechanism among regional states.
These three propositions could transform Iran’s military power into diplomatic and persuasive influence.
On the surface, the tools of the crisis are threefold: mines, missiles, and maritime traffic.
At a deeper level, however, the dispute revolves around three fundamental questions:
Iran can offer a clear answer: the security of Hormuz should be regional, participatory, and based on shared interests—not exclusive and dependent on the permanent presence of extra-regional powers.
The Lark Island incident and Iran’s response in Jordan signal that the dispute surrounding Hormuz has entered a new phase—one in which maritime security, energy, trade, deterrence, and diplomacy have become deeply interconnected.
Under these circumstances, Iran should not present itself merely as a party capable of disrupting Hormuz. Instead, it should seek to establish itself as one of the principal actors capable of creating lasting security in the strait.
This shift in perspective is crucial.
Iran’s power in Hormuz will reach its greatest strategic impact when its “ability to impose costs” is transformed into an “ability to create order.” Deterrence is essential to prevent war, but diplomacy is necessary to prevent a prolonged crisis.
From this perspective, Iran’s strategic proposal could rest on four pillars: deterrence for defense, diplomacy for de-escalation, regional cooperation for security, and balanced exchanges of interests for sustainability.
In this framework, Oman could serve as the link connecting Iran, regional countries, and international actors.
Hormuz should not become a permanent arena for testing power. The security of the strait represents a shared interest for Iran, the Arab countries of the region, global powers, and the international economy.
Iran can therefore use diplomatic initiative to shift the narrative from “the threat to Hormuz” toward “the shared management of Hormuz.”
This approach would neither mean abandoning deterrence nor disregarding Iran’s rights. On the contrary, it would represent an effort to transform Iran’s geopolitical position into diplomatic and economic capital.
Ultimately, the central question is no longer who can close Hormuz. The strategic question is who can transform Hormuz into the safest, most stable, and most predictable energy and trade corridor in the region.
If Iran can answer that question with a concrete plan and diplomatic initiative rather than merely reacting to events, the Lark Island incident could evolve from a military crisis into an opportunity to redefine Iran’s position within the Persian Gulf’s security architecture.
