SAEDNEWS: A year after a failed attempt on Donald Trump's life in Butler, Pennsylvania, the U.S. Secret Service remains embroiled in recrimination, organisational malaise, and a conspicuous absence of high-level accountability.
According to Saed News, citing a CNN investigation, the July 13, 2024 incident has exposed troubling fissures within the agency charged with protecting America's political elite. Congressional inquiries and internal federal reviews — including the Secret Service’s own report — have laid bare a series of cascading failures: the breakdown of communication with local law enforcement who had already identified and confronted the would-be assassin atop a rooftop, mere seconds before he opened fire; the collapse of inter-agency coordination; and the malfunction of critical security infrastructure on the day of the rally.
Not a single high-ranking officer has borne real consequences. Sean Curran, the lead agent in charge of Trump’s protective detail that day, has since been promoted to Director of the Secret Service. Only six individuals — primarily from the Pittsburgh field office — have faced any disciplinary action, and even then, with mild suspensions and no completed penalties to date. Most strikingly, several individuals involved in the lapse were either left untouched or quietly advanced in their careers. This has deepened perceptions within the agency of scapegoating lower-tier operatives for leadership-level failings.
The former Director, Kimberly Cheatle, resigned ten days after the incident under intense criticism. Yet within the agency, the disciplinary pattern has appeared selective, arbitrary, and heavily weighted against the Pittsburgh office. Two of the six suspended employees have lodged formal appeals, while others in Trump's security detail — including a sniper and a junior protective officer — were temporarily stood down. None have seen final resolutions to their cases.
Sources reveal that the aftermath has prompted a wave of departures, draining the Secret Service of institutional memory and expertise. The spectre of a "brain drain" now looms large, as morale plummets and confidence in leadership erodes.
Last week, Republican Senator Rand Paul issued a subpoena demanding documentation on disciplinary measures linked to the Butler shooting. Though the subpoena was later withdrawn after compliance by the agency, neither Paul’s office nor the Secret Service has publicly commented on the development.
In a public statement issued Thursday, Curran stated that the Butler incident remains etched in his memory and claimed the agency has “taken extensive steps” to prevent a recurrence. Yet many inside and outside the agency remain unconvinced.
The litany of failures on that day is sobering. Local officers had identified Thomas Matthew Crooks, the shooter, and engaged him before he fired at Trump — a fact the federal detail on-site did not learn until after the shots were fired. A confusion over perimeter security responsibilities, the absence of aerial sightline obstructions, and a failure of drone-jamming equipment all contributed to the catastrophic lapse. One officer reportedly never received a functioning radio to coordinate with ground teams.
Most damning, perhaps, is the failure to integrate key intelligence into operational plans. Just weeks before the event, the FBI circulated classified assessments pointing to a long-range threat to Trump, possibly from the Iranian government — a scenario that would have made rooftop snipers a clear concern. But several Secret Service leaders, including the Pittsburgh lead, were unaware of this intelligence until after the shooting.
The Senate’s final report castigated the agency for failing to activate its counter-surveillance unit — tasked precisely with identifying threats such as Crooks. Although Crooks ultimately acted alone and without any ties to foreign entities, the failure to disseminate intelligence has been described as symptomatic of a deeper dysfunction.
Democratic Senator Gary Peters, former chair of the Senate Homeland Security Committee, lamented the absence of a clear command structure. “There should have been a very simple answer to the question, ‘Who was responsible?’” he told CNN. “There wasn’t. That was shocking.”
A classified memo circulated in April appears to confirm that under new policy interpretations, Curran — as head of the protective detail that day — would now be held ultimately accountable. Yet the agency has shown little appetite for retroactive responsibility.
What remains, one year later, is an agency rattled by exposure, confused by protocol, and increasingly isolated in the eyes of the public and its own personnel. In the vacuum of accountability, the very institution meant to stand between power and peril finds itself dangerously exposed.
