SAEDNEWS: From Tuesday evening to early Wednesday morning, reports emerged of Israeli fighter jets nearing Iran’s western borders before turning back. At the same time, footage showing a MiG-29 jet flying over Tehran circulated widely, sparking debates among the public.
According to the political news service of SaedNews, Farhikhtegan newspaper reported: A reliable source has neither confirmed nor denied Israeli combat flights; however, the situation can be analyzed broadly in both scenarios. Whether Tel Aviv dispatched its fighter jets or not, it had objectives in this strategic messaging that require examination.
The regime is producing a narrative through selective news and certain actions suggesting that any move toward war depends not on long-term preparations but on a decision made in the moment. This narrative reinforces the policy of maintaining a “shadow of war” over Iran. By promoting the idea that the regime only needs a few hours of decision-making to launch a war, it creates a constant anticipation of conflict.
This narrative is particularly influential among the public, lower-ranking officials, and economic actors, largely because it is difficult to convey the real situation to these groups amid the strategic messaging. Iran’s policy in communicating about Israeli attacks, guided by the highest political authorities, balances between avoiding exaggeration and understatement of the enemy’s capabilities. Transparent communication, rather than magnifying or minimizing, allows for a clearer understanding of the regime’s military capacity and its actual standing.
Several points illustrate this: Initially, some analysts dismissed Israel’s ability to strike targets in Iranian territory. Later, following conflicts, others mistakenly emphasized that Israel had only recently gained such capabilities with U.S. assistance. This pattern led to escalating misconceptions, with some predicting Israel’s firepower could multiply after a hypothetical 12-day war. The initial underestimation thus fueled exponential exaggeration in subsequent assessments, though all three phases contained errors. In reality, Israel had long possessed the ability for long-range operations with U.S. support.
Historically, Israel demonstrated long-range strike capabilities: in 1981, F-16 jets attacked facilities in Baghdad, Iraq—160 kilometers from Iran’s western borders. In 1985, F-15s bombed the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunisia, a 2,300-kilometer strike, more than twice the distance from Israel to Iran. These operations, conducted 44 and 40 years ago respectively, confirm Israel’s long-standing long-range capabilities.
Since 2000, Israel enhanced its reach by equipping significant numbers of F-16I jets with conformal fuel tanks, extending their range to central Iranian regions. However, these capabilities do not equate to the capacity for large-scale war. Israel possesses the tools to conduct operations, not sustained high-intensity conflict. By the early 2000s, the regime had strengthened two main features: long-range air-launched weapons like ballistic missiles and acquisition of F-35 stealth fighters. Even with these upgrades, Israel’s long-range firepower remains limited, suited for targeted operations rather than prolonged warfare.
During the early days of a potential conflict with Iran, Israel took two key steps, aware of its limited resilience against Iranian strikes: assassinating several senior commanders and bombing missile base access points in western Iran to prevent immediate heavy retaliation. Israeli strikes were non-distributed, targeting provinces one at a time—West Azerbaijan, Lorestan, and later Khuzestan and southern regions.
Over a hypothetical 12-day conflict, Israel undertook multiple operations against Iran, but three elements amplified perceptions of the war: first, high-profile targeted assassinations; second, deployment of armed infiltrators with micro-drones and anti-armor missiles to strike defense systems and missile launchers, as well as psychological operations using largely inert drones to occupy air defenses and instill fear; third, U.S. operations targeting three nuclear facilities.
The latter two were executed directly by the U.S. and NATO, with the infiltrators acting covertly and the U.S. taking responsibility for bombing facilities. These actions had limited outcomes: infiltrator units suffered losses, and U.S. strikes produced ambiguous results in underground facilities. Additionally, U.S. attacks triggered Iranian retaliatory strikes against the U.S. CENTCOM regional air operations center in Qatar.
Israeli military actions in such a scenario were mainly limited assassinations and selective strikes. Precision weapons aided them significantly, but they lacked sufficient munitions to influence the broader Iranian territory. Their operations still rely heavily on laser designation from infiltrators or drones. Israel can operate inside Iran, but it cannot connect operations into a large-scale war.
Other aspects of recent developments include:
Israel may shift focus to operations in Lebanon, using the threat of war to deter Iranian societal and governmental support.
Psychological effects on currency and gold markets are intended, as perceived signs of war may drive public investment in these assets, raising prices.
Israeli military actions aim to signal readiness against Iranian allies expected to supply weapons under prior agreements, creating the impression that sending weapons now could be futile and result in their destruction.
