SAEDNEWS: In recent days, two accounts of General Bagheri’s reaction to a figure in the secret session of True Promise 3 have been published; one by Abbas Araghchi, claiming that Bagheri confronted an attendee for accusing Pezeshkian’s government, and another by Peyman Jebelli, denying any verbal clash took place.
According to Saed News quoting Etemad, In recent days, two accounts of General Bagheri’s reaction to a figure in the secret session of True Promise 3 have been published; one by Abbas Araghchi, claiming that Bagheri confronted an attendee for accusing Pezeshkian’s government, and another by Peyman Jebelli, denying any verbal clash took place.
The story began with Abbas Araghchi’s recollection during the program The Story of War. In this interview, while discussing various issues such as the 12-day war and Iran’s missile operations against Israel, he referred to some attacks on the government, emphasizing that contrary to the atmosphere created by hardliners, the government and military forces are in full coordination.
In this part of the conversation, Araghchi recounted a memory from the session where the decision regarding Operation True Promise 3 was made. He said that when one individual in the session accused the government and President Masoud Pezeshkian of obstructing the execution of the operation, General Bagheri, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, stood against him, rejected his claim, and defended Pezeshkian.
Araghchi said in the program:
"When True Promise 3 was discussed, one of the friends criticized and objected, saying: Why is the President against it? God bless General Bagheri, in that session he confronted the person who said this. He asked: Why are you saying this? I am responsible for defending the country, and the moment I am sure I can defend the country against the consequences of Operation True Promise 3, I will do my duty. I haven’t asked the President yet, because in my view we haven’t reached that stage. He – General Bagheri – strongly defended the President."
This recollection opened speculation about the identity of the figure confronted by Bagheri. Every listener watching the program would likely assume that the closest option to such a figure could have been Saeed Jalili. In the same interview, the program’s host said he had realized who the person was, to which Araghchi replied with a laugh: “No, it’s not who you think it is.”
Three weeks after these remarks, Peyman Jebelli, head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), completely denied this account. In an interview with Khabar Online, he emphasized that he was present in that session and, despite stating that “Araghchi does not lie”, claimed that this was media fabrication, insisting that no such confrontation occurred between General Bagheri and anyone in that meeting.
Contrary to much speculation, it seems the least important part of this issue is exactly who that individual was. The main issue is the approach and behavior of this current: an approach that tries to portray the government and military forces as being in conflict with one another. A current that, months before General Bagheri’s martyrdom, voiced harsh criticisms against him, with figures and media linked to a specific political faction launching political attacks on Bagheri.
When in Farvardin of this year, General Bagheri conveyed his New Year’s greetings to the people of Iran with his presence in Persepolis, a spectrum of forces from the Paydari Front and associates of Saeed Jalili strongly criticized him. In the short video released of Martyr Bagheri beside the ancient Persepolis monument, he stood and, while referring to the themes of peace, tranquility, friendship, and brotherhood with other nations—which have been the historical ideals of the Iranian people—he emphasized that the approach of the Islamic Republic in its relations with its neighbors has also moved and continues to move along this perennial ideal.
After his presence in Persepolis during the New Year’s transition, Fouad Izadi, a figure close to Saeed Jalili, sarcastically remarked about Bagheri: “If a military man feels that he is interested in diplomatic language, he must take off his uniform.”
In a video, he said: “Our military force should not, under these circumstances, send a message of peace. If a military man feels that he is interested in diplomatic language, he must take off his uniform and go become a diplomat; certainly, Dr. Araqchi also needs help.” Now, nearly five months after this episode, it seems clear why this faction was angry at Martyr Bagheri and even sarcastically pushed him toward removing his military attire and assisting the foreign minister Pezeshkian. But Fouad Izadi’s remarks were only the beginning of the marathon of attacks against Martyr Bagheri.
On the 26th of May, Major General Bagheri delivered a speech at the anniversary of the founding of Islamic Azad University, and parts of his remarks provoked reactions. Bagheri said in part of his speech: “Our [armed forces’] need is not limited solely to technical sciences and industrial technologies. Our very complex and evolving society requires scientific work. If the police command wants to deal with a hard approach of batons and daggers, it will lead nowhere. We need prudence. Our police officer must properly understand the new generation, know their weak points, and manage the society whose security is entrusted to them.”
Rajanews, under the management of Meysam Nili, acting as the unofficial organ of some of Saeed Jalili’s forces, the Paydari Front, and the circle of the thirteenth government, wrote on this matter: “Less than six months was enough time for the image of General Bagheri on the mural of ‘Jang-Balad’ to give way to a commander who delivers his Nowruz message from Persepolis and without a military uniform; explains instead of the foreign minister about the Leader’s response to Trump’s letter; and warns officials against talking to the new generation with batons.”
Another part of the report stated: “With the explicit support of the Supreme Leader for the armed forces to carry out His Eminence’s clear order regarding changing the enemy’s calculations, how is it that in such a short time such positions are expressed by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces? And that too without the slightest reference to the mission of ‘Wa’de-ye Sadegh 3’? The commander concerned with ‘dialogue with the new generation’—how many university sessions has he attended so far to answer the questions of the new generation, or what action has he taken regarding solving the problem of conscription of the ‘evolving new generation’ that directly pertains to his domain? These questions and similar ones will unravel important knots of this ambiguity as to why the enduring image of Bagheri and Hajizadeh in Wa’de-ye Sadegh 1 has these days transformed into such a figure with such positions.”
The piece published on Rajanews was so harsh that it provoked even some other media outlets close to the principlist current. Tabnak at the time wrote in a report: “The irony of fate is that the very people who shout about ‘defending values’ are today attacking the most valuable men of the system. Opponents of Bagheri, unintentionally, highlight his greatness before history. The man who yesterday was a hero on the battlefronts is today a university professor, senior advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, and a well-versed author in philosophy and military strategy — and you? What do you have except ‘arrow-like words in the dark’ that lead nowhere?”
Tasnim News Agency also strongly criticized the content published in Rajanews and, in an article introducing Bagheri as a figure, wrote that Major General Mohammad Hossein Bagheri is 'one of the most influential figures in Iran’s armed forces in recent decades': 'Less than six months was enough for the image of Sardar Bagheri on the “Jang-Balad” mural to be replaced by a commander who delivers his Nowruz message from Persepolis without military uniform; explains the Leader’s response to Trump’s letter instead of the foreign minister; and warns officials against talking to the younger generation with batons. Each of the actions of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces has elicited different reactions, but the important question is: what equation and calculation has led the country’s second highest military official to such behaviors? Despite the explicit support of the Leader of the Revolution for the armed forces in implementing His Eminence’s clear order to change the enemy’s calculations, how is it that in such a short time, such positions emerge from the Chief of the General Staff; and that too without the slightest reference to the mission of “Operation Wa’de-Sadeq 3”? The commander, who is concerned about “dialogue with the new generation,” has so far attended how many university meetings and answered the questions of the new generation, or what action has he taken regarding the conscription problem of the “new generation in transformation,” which directly relates to his subordinates? These questions and the like will untie important knots of this ambiguity as to why the lasting image of Bagheri and Hajizadeh in Wa’de-Sadeq 1 has in recent days changed into such a figure with such positions.'
The issue of the attacks in the last months of Sardar Bagheri’s life is still a focus within the political language of the Principlist camp. After the suspension of the broadcast of the program “The Story of the War” and the controversy that the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) stirred up over this program’s interview with Abbas Araqchi, Mohammad Hossein Pouyanfar wrote on the social network X: 'Mr. Jebelli, the production of the program “The Story of the War” is not a weakening of IRIB; if Mr. Araqchi had said sooner and more clearly who that person was that received a firm and logical response from Martyr Bagheri regarding Wa’de-Sadeq 3, perhaps the martyred commanders would not have been subjected to so many accusations and insults!' During the same days, the Principlist newspaper Khorasan also wrote: 'Some active accounts on social networks claim that the main reason for stopping the broadcast was part of Araqchi’s remarks in this interview. He mentioned the confrontation of Martyr Major General Mohammad Bagheri, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, with one of the officials in an important meeting, which speculations have attributed to the Supreme National Security Council. The minds of many, including the program’s host, went toward Saeed Jalili, but Araqchi emphasized that “it is not the person you think.” Nevertheless, it seems that IRIB’s management team did not deem it appropriate to air this interview. Considering that other episodes had also been recorded, but production was stopped and even access to the online version was restricted, this decision practically brought the entire project to a complete end.'
The actions of IRIB, which serves as the showcase of a particular intellectual current within the conservative camp, are not limited to the start of the Iran-Israel war and its aftermath. This trend existed even before the war broke out.
Among other actions of IRIB against the government’s diplomacy was the strange tweet by Morteza Gharghi, a reporter for IRIB News Network. In a tweet with the hashtag “Rome Talks,” he claimed that the United States had requested that Iran’s enriched uranium shipments be transferred to Russia and that missiles carrying warheads be deactivated. In return, the United States would release Iran’s funds and lift part of the sanctions. Although this claim was denied within hours of its publication, it was reminiscent of the actions of some so-called informed sources and news outlets such as PressTV during the JCPOA revival negotiations, when they sought to obstruct the talks by spreading false claims.
Last year, Soheil Karimi, who appeared on IRIB as an expert on Syrian affairs, analyzed the situation in Syria and Iran’s role in it in an interview with IRIB News Network. In a strange analysis, he stated that Iranian forces were not allowed to be present on the battlefield! In another part of this program, he said: “We should not abandon our brothers and sisters in these difficult conditions and must rush to their aid,” emphasizing: “At present, Iranian forces have not been permitted direct combat in this country.”
In one of these programs, Mohammadreza Gholamreza, former deputy of the Quds Force, stated: “The Turks and some Arab countries deceived us; two months ago, they guaranteed that nothing would happen in Syria.”
Around the same period, a man named Kamali appeared on IRIB as a Syria expert, and in his remarks implicitly expressed support for the armed Syrian opposition after the fall of Bashar al-Assad!
In addition, Hossein Akbari, Iran’s ambassador to Syria, said in a live interview with IRIB News about recent developments in Damascus: “We predicted this event, and almost none of our colleagues from different institutions of the Islamic Republic were present at the embassy. No one at the embassy was harmed. After ‘Homs,’ not only the Syrian army but also the people did not resist anywhere.” He added: “This current movement in Syria is different from ISIS, and they had previously fought against ISIS.”
In another program recently aired by IRIB, political analyst Mostafa Khoshcheshm narrated a meeting between a senior Iranian commander and Bashar al-Assad, saying: “While Assad had direct phone lines with the United States, Turkey, and Russia on his desk, he told him: if you also wish to help, take up part of the burden!”
Amid the various positions regarding the fall of Assad’s government in Syria, the statements of two figures are noteworthy: Amirhossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, one of the presidential candidates and Vice President in the 13th administration, and Seyed Mohammad Hosseini, Parliamentary Vice President in the same administration.
Seyed Mohammad Hosseini, Raisi’s Parliamentary Vice President, in a tweet linked the bitter recent developments in the Middle East to the death of Ebrahim Raisi and wrote: “All the bitter events of recent months (the martyrdom of Ismail Haniyeh, Yahya Sinwar, Seyed Hassan Nasrallah, Seyed Hashem and Hezbollah commanders, the Zionist regime’s attacks on targets in Iran, the brutal bombing of Lebanon, the collapse of the Syrian government, and...) began with the crash of the martyred President’s helicopter on May 19!”
Amirhossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, Vice President in the 13th administration, also reacted to the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, saying: “Satan always tempts, but he does not act on the temptations and promises he gives. Any statesman who accepts the temptations of the arrogant powers and their enemies will fall into negligence and defeat. When a statesman analyzes matters in this way, the army and armed forces of that country will also become weak and submissive, especially when widespread infiltration occurs within the army. Unfortunately, what happened in Syria was predictable; officials of the Islamic Republic repeatedly warned, but it was ignored and led to this situation. When the Leader said years ago not to consider Hezbollahis as extremists, it was because these individuals save the country in times of danger. If Syria also had such Hezbollahis, it would not have fallen into this state.”
From the very first hours after the announcement of Assad’s fall, some cyber accounts also adopted a strange approach toward these developments and even began criticizing the military forces. The publication of posts and hashtags such as “Diplomacy on the battlefield and battlefield in the council… beautiful, isn’t it?” alongside these tweets, and the analyses of Ali Alizadeh criticizing military policies, also received wide reactions: “Bravo to Netanyahu, welcome Jews in the 21st century. The only thing is that in this battle we didn’t have Ali and his Zulfiqar. He single-handedly defeated everyone. Now our dear ones keep chanting slogans. All of this is the result of procrastination and non-tactical retreats over the past year. The only thing we didn’t see was haste, and everything we did see was hesitation.”
Another one of the cyber accounts on Twitter, in praise of Netanyahu and as a jab at the domestic forces, wrote: “Dominance over the region belongs to the one whose only strategy against enemies is defeating them and who makes the smartest and boldest decisions, not the one who every few years craves surrender and negotiation and kicks his allies aside.” These remarks came while only a few days later, Hossein Salami explained the IRGC’s position on this matter. Hossein Salami, Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, one day before Ayatollah Khamenei’s speech on the same subject, said in a gathering of IRGC commanders: “For months we were aware of the movements of the militants and Takfiris. Our brothers had managed, using intelligence tactics, to discover their attack routes and transfer them to the political and military leadership of Syria.” Salami also, in his speech on regional developments, revealed that Iranian intelligence officials had warned Syrian officials about the events three months earlier, but he also said it was not clear whether these reports had reached the country’s top officials or had been “lost somewhere in the middle.”
Clearly, during the one-year activity of Massoud Pezeshkian’s government, there were many attempts from the camp close to Saeed Jalili and the Paydari Front forces to project the image that the government is responsible for inaction against Israel.
It seems that Saeed Jalili’s camp, which clearly also controls the state broadcaster, is trying with a simple formula to present a simplistic picture to its audience within the Principlist movement. A picture that says: everyone is failing to safeguard the country’s security—except for the Jalili brothers’ camp!
The think tank of this current, after watching this episode of the program The Story of the War and hearing the sensitive anecdote of Araghchi about General Bagheri, made a simple calculation: If the influential Hezbollah grassroots figures, the residents of “Eitaa” channels and groups, and the traditional supporters of Saeed Jalili see and hear Abbas Araghchi in this program, then what possibility remains to preserve the dichotomy between Jalili and non-Jalili? If this dichotomy collapses, what will this intellectual current—which has institutionalized its political identity on “confrontation”—have to offer in the electoral and public space? With what narrative will Saeed Jalili’s 15-million-vote base be fed?
In a situation where Bagheri’s defense of the Pezeshkian government takes place, and Abbas Araghchi explains in his interview on the program ‘The Story of the War’ that there is no theoretical disagreement between the government, the IRGC, and the higher levels of the establishment in carrying out military operations, what ground remains for Saeed Jalili and his line of thought to continue the game and what space is left for the continuation of his political life?
The current state of the state broadcaster (IRIB) provides him with the ability and possibility for both large and small maneuvers; from setting a single voice on the IRIB’s airwaves, to removing an analytical-historical program from every platform and media outlet, and even denying a memory that the foreign minister recounts!
This argument clearly shows that the continuation of Jalili’s political life and that of his accompanying current is dependent on shaping sharp confrontations among different parts of the establishment — and of course, on having IRIB under his control.
