Lying is normally forbidden — yet reason and the transmitted tradition allow a very small, tightly defined set of exceptions (and prefer toriya when possible) to avert greater harm.
Lying is intrinsically a very bad act, and many social ills and disorders stem from it. In some statements from the Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them) lying is even described as the key to other sins. If, however, a person lies to create affection, remove enmity, and bring about reconciliation — so that peace and intimacy result — such lying is not considered forbidden.
At the same time, exceptional situations occur in which telling the truth would spark major sedition and corruption, while not telling the truth (or avoiding the truth) would extinguish the danger. For example: if speaking the truth about someone’s slander would inflame a great conflict with heavy loss, then telling the truth in that moment would be wrong. Rational prudence dictates that when the harm of exposing truth exceeds the benefit of speaking it, one should avoid doing so.
Islamic legal principles confirm this rational rule and, in these exceptional circumstances, permit falsehood for the sake of necessity.
First, this notion is strictly exceptional — lying is not permitted generally, and people must not use “expedient lie” as a pretext for routine deception or personal gain.
Second, Islam emphasises the issue so strongly that even when necessity appears to permit falsehood the tradition recommends toriya (ambiguity) rather than plain lying. Among our jurists this allowance is well known: instead of telling a direct lie, one may speak in a way that the listener infers a meaning different from the speaker’s intention (so the speaker has not uttered an explicit falsehood).
Toriya means — in necessary cases — to say something whose literal wording is true but which the listener will take to mean something else. For instance, if asked whether someone spoke ill of you and you know full well she did in another place, you might answer, “Not when you were there,” implying that the slur was said elsewhere. You have not told a direct lie, but the listener infers there was no slandering at all. In cases where the leaders or Imams reportedly used an expedient expression to preserve life or prevent discord, such wording is usually of the toriya type and thus not counted as a lie.
It is clear that there is no toriya or expedient falsehood in the Qur’anic verses themselves; divine revelation does not require such devices.
From an intellectual perspective, lying is only permissible in necessity. Necessity falls into three categories: coercion, dire compulsion (urgent need), and the state of being between two harms.
Coercion: where someone is forced to speak and loses free will — e.g., the case of Ammar ibn Yasir under torture who recanted under duress.
Urgent need (darura): where telling the truth would cause a major harm to life, wealth, or honour, and falsehood secures a vital good.
Being between two evils (dawrān amr baynayn): when saying the truth would lead to one forbidden or harmful outcome and lying would lead to another; if the lesser evil is to be chosen, lying may be permitted.
In these cases, both the religious law and sensible reason agree: if one harm clearly outweighs the other, the lesser harm may be tolerated and falsehood is permitted in that narrow sense.
There are transmitted reports and sayings of the Imams that jurists have used to infer permitted falsehood in exceptional cases. These circumstances include:
Reconciliation between people (to restore relations and remove rancour)
Deceiving an enemy in war (military stratagems that mislead the enemy)
False promises to one’s family (e.g., to save them from immediate harm)
Repelling the aggression of an oppressor
For the sake of a public good and to avert corruption
Tip | |
|---|---|
Treat the rule as exceptional | Expedient falsehood is allowed only in narrow, specific cases — don’t use it as a general excuse. |
Prefer toriya (ambiguous wording) | Where possible, speak in a way that is literally true but prevents harm, rather than uttering a direct lie. |
Apply the three necessity tests | Consider coercion, urgent need (darura), or being between two harms before permitting falsehood. |
Aim to prevent greater harm | Only when truth would produce greater corruption or loss may falsehood be considered. |
Seek counsel and restraint | Don’t improvise moral exceptions — consult trusted authorities and act cautiously. |
