SAEDNEWS: Iran’s Foreign Minister warned in a letter to the UN that the European Troika’s misinterpretation of the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism sets a dangerous precedent, weakening the Security Council’s credibility and integrity.
According to Saed News, quoting ISNA; the text of Seyed Abbas Araghchi’s letter is as follows: ‘Hereby, I address some of the false claims contained in the letter dated 8 August 2025 by the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (hereinafter referred to as the Troika) concerning matters related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).
The aforementioned letter, by distorting realities, constitutes yet another attempt to pave the way for two courses of action, both of which are unfounded and create a dangerous precedent in undermining the credibility and integrity of the Security Council and its resolutions.
It is worth reiterating that such conduct cannot in any way be justified with reference to the completely legitimate and lawful remedial measures of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which were implemented gradually and proportionately, and in full conformity with the procedures and rights set forth in the JCPOA. Nevertheless, the Troika’s letter, in an ironic manner, inadvertently reveals two fundamental flaws in the Troika’s reasoning for any potential attempt to invoke what is termed as the “automatic return of sanctions.”
a) The sequence of events is of significance. The Troika, by making the false claim that “Iran only activated the dispute resolution mechanism in July 2020,” seeks to invalidate Iran’s remedial measures, distort the chronology of events, and simultaneously conceal the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran had formally activated the dispute resolution mechanism in its letter dated 10 May 2018. This declaration led to the convening of Joint Commission meetings and other envisaged measures for the full exhaustion of the mechanism. Iran once again, on 21 August 2018, while emphasizing recourse to Paragraph 36, explicitly stated that it had previously “resorted to the dispute resolution mechanism under Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA, pursuant to which the Joint Commission subsequently convened meetings at the political directors’ level and the foreign ministers’ level on 25 May and 6 July 2018.”
By raising the issue of sequence, the Troika implicitly acknowledges that the order of activation of the dispute resolution mechanism by different parties is of importance; and that measures taken under Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA cannot serve as justification for countermeasures by other parties. In short, the Troika’s own reasoning admits that remedial measures cannot be invoked against prior remedial measures by the opposite party, and such invocation is unacceptable and inapplicable.
b) The false claim regarding the necessity of recognition of the activation of the dispute resolution mechanism. The Troika, by falsely claiming that “any other recourse to this mechanism has neither at the time nor at present been recognized by the JCPOA participants,” seeks to suggest that the validity of the activation of the dispute resolution mechanism requires consensus among the JCPOA members. Based on this same logic, the Troika’s own attempt to activate the mechanism or the automatic return of sanctions would be devoid of validity, since it has never been explicitly recognized by the other JCPOA participants.
If only one case of the activation of the dispute resolution mechanism is to be deemed valid, recognized, and fully exhausted, it is the case initiated by the Islamic Republic of Iran on 10 May 2018. This action led to the convening of an extraordinary Joint Commission meeting on 25 May 2018 and a foreign ministers’ level meeting on 6 July 2018, both of which were held at Iran’s request. Following these meetings, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in several communications including the letters dated 21 August and 6 November 2018 as well as the letter dated 7 April 2019, explicitly stated that it had invoked Paragraph 36 of the JCPOA, and that should the substantial non-performance by other parties persist, it would exercise its rights and “gradually and according to the envisaged timetable, suspend the implementation of its commitments under the JCPOA.”
The Troika’s letter, in fact, invalidates itself. Their attempt to activate the dispute resolution mechanism, which was accompanied by their own continued non-performance, amounted to “a remedial measure against a remedial measure,” which was neither recognized by all JCPOA participants nor fully exhausted.
As detailed in the letter dated 29 January 2020 from the then-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the JCPOA Coordinator (attached herewith), Iran had long before the commencement of its remedial measures effectively and formally activated the dispute resolution mechanism and exhausted it fully; and this occurred only when it became evident that the issues arising from the withdrawal of the United States of America from the JCPOA and the imposition of sanctions against Iran by other members could not be remedied.
It is emphasized that the Troika’s reference to the JCPOA dispute resolution mechanism by invoking their letter of 14 January 2020, in response to Iran’s remedial measures from May 2019 onwards, is entirely misleading and irrelevant. As repeatedly stated in various communications, the decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran to suspend the implementation of its commitments was in full conformity with the rights stipulated under Paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, and was a legitimate and lawful response to the unilateral withdrawal of the United States of America from the JCPOA and the re-imposition of its illegal sanctions. Therefore, it is wholly unreasonable for the Troika to consider their own decision not to implement their commitments or their attempt to trigger the automatic return of sanctions as a reaction to Iran’s legitimate remedial measures; measures which were undertaken a full year after the illegal withdrawal of the United States of America and the failure of the European Union and the Troika to implement their commitments.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has explicitly and formally, and on multiple occasions, informed the Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the JCPOA, and through him the other members, that it has invoked Article 36 of the JCPOA and the dispute resolution mechanism contained therein. In particular, in the letter dated 29 January 2020, Iran specified that it had fully exhausted all avenues foreseen in Article 36. The meeting of the Joint Commission at the level of foreign ministers dated 6 July 2018 also recognized the issues referred by Iran to the Joint Commission as “unresolved issues” and subsequently adopted a set of commitments in this regard. These issues remain “unresolved” to this day, and no outcome has been achieved that satisfies Iran as the complaining party. Issues that remain unresolved for Iran cannot be considered as a basis for the Troika’s decision to activate the automatic reimposition mechanism of sanctions.
It should be noted that these realities in no way prejudice the exclusive rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran under Article 26 of the JCPOA; an article that explicitly stipulates that Iran “will consider the reimposition or reintroduction of sanctions as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA, in whole or in part.”
In contrast to the ill-intentioned conduct of the Troika, the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran—taken fully in conformity with its rights under Articles 26 and 36 of the JCPOA—were aimed at safeguarding the agreement by compelling the parties to comply, not at undermining it. Iran provided adequate notifications, participated in numerous Joint Commission meetings in good faith, calibrated its actions to be reversible, and sustained diplomatic engagement with the objective of restoring the full implementation of the JCPOA by all parties. The Troika’s portrayal of these legitimate measures as “non-implementation of commitments” neglects their own responsibility in provoking this legitimate recourse.
Resolution 2231 must expire on the “termination day.”
Within the framework of its policy of using the automatic reimposition mechanism of sanctions as leverage to extract concessions from others, the Troika has “proposed” a limited extension of the “relevant provisions of Security Council Resolution 2231,” conditional upon Iran fulfilling certain demands. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believes that Resolution 2231 must expire according to the timetable foreseen within it. Any other attempt, contrary to the facts and disregarding the ultimate purpose of the resolution, would create an improper precedent in the functioning of the Security Council and would deepen divisions within the Council. It is evident that in such an unfortunate scenario, the Islamic Republic of Iran will respond decisively and proportionately, taking into account its supreme national interests.
The Islamic Republic of Iran calls upon the Security Council to fully adhere to the binding timelines contained in Resolution 2231, so that its provisions conclude as foreseen and thereby pave the way for the resumption of diplomatic engagement in a more constructive atmosphere free from coercion and threats.
Iran always welcomes diplomacy
The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believes that diplomacy remains the most effective and efficient path for resolving disputes. As emphasized in the meeting of Iranian Deputy Foreign Ministers with the political directors of the European Union and the Troika on 25 July in Istanbul, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its commitment to meaningful diplomatic engagement with the aim of reaching a new agreement; one that, while respecting Iran’s rights under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, addresses all mutual concerns, including the unjust sanctions that have targeted the livelihood and welfare of the Iranian people.
We call on all members of the Security Council to reject illegitimate political manipulations and to strive to safeguard the integrity of international law and the authority of the Security Council. The path forward lies in mutual respect, not coercion.
It would be appreciated if you would kindly instruct that this correspondence be registered and circulated as a document of the General Assembly and the Security Council.
Please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
