America’s New Strategy at the Crossroads of War and Diplomacy: Is the Old Talkative Man Mocking Us?

According to the Political Desk of the SaedNews news outlet, Farhikhtegan newspaper wrote: After the United States twice prepared to attack Iran but ultimately backed down due to Iran’s readiness and that of the Resistance Axis, it has now raised the issue of negotiations accompanied by threats.

At this critical moment, it is important to discuss the possible scenarios ahead in order to form a clear picture and offer a reasonable prescription for the near future.

On the surface, the situation appears to involve a suspension of military attack plans and a return to the negotiating table. However, during the period from Farvardin to Khordad, the outward appearance was the same, and it ultimately resulted in a military strike in the middle of negotiations. Therefore, no rational observer places trust in such appearances.

Of course, the Islamic Republic, especially to make its position clear domestically, has approached the negotiating table while maintaining military readiness and verbal deterrent threats, and it genuinely declares its readiness for fair negotiations. At the same time, everyone knows that Iran’s military forces remain at the highest level of preparedness to deliver a comprehensive regional response that would strike the enemy decisively.

But what are the scenarios and the logic behind them?

1. Negotiation out of necessity:
Because the United States is unable to carry out a rapid and decisive operation without facing a serious Iranian response in the next stage, it has come to the negotiating table in the hope of extracting concessions under the shadow of war. In this scenario, U.S. acceptance of Iran’s right to enrichment and Iran’s acceptance of transferring 400 kilograms of uranium could provide a way out of the year-long deadlock and lead to a limited agreement. In effect, the U.S. would have abandoned the goal of regime change in Iran and shifted toward securing nuclear concessions instead. This scenario has the lowest probability.

2. Deception and attack during negotiations:
In this scenario, the United States seeks to repeat the previous pattern: keeping Iran engaged in talks and then launching an attack through deception. Given past experience and Iran’s maximum readiness, this scenario is also unlikely.

3. Buying time to prepare for an attack:
To prevent an Iranian strike, the United States needs to deploy additional forces to the region, particularly in the field of air and missile defense. This process has been underway over the past two weeks but has not yet reached its final stage. At the same time, part of the enemy’s plan relies on domestic terrorist forces. However, blows dealt by Iran’s law enforcement and security agencies to terrorist cells inside the country have disrupted their cohesion and readiness. Time is therefore needed to rebuild these networks. Thus, the U.S. raises the issue of negotiations as a pretext to buy time while simultaneously rebuilding and completing its military and terrorist capacities.

4. Long-term attrition through conditioning Iran’s economy and society:
In this scenario, the U.S. goal is neither a result-oriented negotiation nor a short-term military war. Instead, it aims to immerse Iran’s economy and society in a constant cycle of negotiation–war news, intensifying economic pressure, manipulating currency, gold, and essential goods markets, and pushing society once again toward protest and eventually unrest. This represents a form of internal social and economic attrition designed to push society and the governing system toward collapse, or close to it.

In parallel, the constant state of military readiness leads to fatigue within Iran’s armed forces, while various deception plans are monitored by the enemy over time. This scenario can coincide with the previous one—enhancing U.S. military readiness in the region and reactivating terrorist networks—making it the most probable scenario.

The key point across all these scenarios is that the United States is the primary actor with the initiative. Iran’s role, in all cases, is reactive—responding to U.S. decisions rather than shaping them. While this reactivity does not imply weakness, it does mean that initiative is not currently in Iran’s hands. Therefore, the most important task at this moment is to seize the initiative from the enemy and implement measures that deprive it of multiple options.

Putting a regional threat on the table—first communicated privately to the U.S. last week and publicly announced this week by the Supreme Leader—was a major activated capability. Still, the gap between Iran’s and America’s operational circles must be reduced so that Iran can truly take the initiative.

The discussion of changing Iran’s military doctrine from defense to rapid and extensive offensive operations, as stated by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, is also a step forward. Now is the time either to implement further measures or at least to make firm decisions about them. Iran is prepared for scenarios one and two—both genuine negotiations and short-term war—but for scenarios three and especially four, it must be even more prepared. If the enemy seeks to impose attrition, Iran must turn that attrition into a global issue through certain actions, particularly in the Strait of Hormuz. Naturally, this does not mean closing the Strait, but creating certain disruptions could be helpful—especially if the enemy seeks to maintain the upper hand without attacking, while Iran faces internal and military exhaustion. In essence, Iran does not move toward war, but it will not accept attrition without imposing global costs. The details of this proposal require further discussion, but the key point is that such options exist.

In addition, dialogue with the public is essential, particularly to explain the issue of terrorism. At this moment, public assistance in identifying terrorist cells is more crucial than anything else for security agencies. The people should be humbly asked to help protect their national security and, as during the 12-day war, to report suspicious activities.