SAEDNEWS: An expert on Russian affairs regarding Moscow’s recent draft on postponing the “snapback” mechanism said: “This Russian action is symbolic and reflects Moscow’s supportive and empathetic approach in response to the political pressures exerted on Tehran.”
With intensified diplomatic movements and just hours before a new round of Iran’s nuclear talks with three European countries in Geneva, Amvaj Media reported that Russia has submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council to extend Resolution 2231, which expires in October. According to informed sources, this move has been supported by China and aims to prevent an imminent confrontation between Tehran and Western governments. Lawrence Norman, a Wall Street Journal reporter, also wrote on the social media platform X (formerly Twitter) that the Russian draft includes a clause which, if approved, would render the activation of the “snapback mechanism” impossible in the future—a clause likely unacceptable to the three European countries.
According to Norman, the first clause of the Russian draft states that any substantive review of the implementation of Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA will be suspended, and the activation of the snapback mechanism falls under the same provision. This resolution has been presented by Russia as an ally of Iran and another member of the JCPOA, even though analysts previously noted that all initiatives proposed to prevent the activation of the snapback mechanism, such as Iran, Russia, and China leaving the JCPOA, would likely go nowhere.
It remains unclear whether the submission of such a draft by Moscow could obstruct the automatic re-imposition of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. The Iranian nuclear file has reached this sensitive point while the European troika previously threatened that, if Tehran did not accept their conditions, they would activate the snapback mechanism—a tool that would automatically reinstate UN Security Council sanctions.
Three European countries consider that reaching an agreement between Tehran and Washington, full cooperation by Iran with safeguards bodies, and reducing enrichment to zero are preconditions for postponing this deadline and extending Resolution 2231; conditions that Tehran, while regarding the very basis of the snapback mechanism as illegal, has described as unacceptable.
Meanwhile, London’s Telegraph recently claimed that Ali Larijani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, is actively trying to reduce the country’s uranium enrichment level to around 20 percent in order to prevent the escalation of sanctions and rising tensions. A group of observers argues that this step could represent a significant retreat from Iran’s nuclear capability.
However, this claim was made in a context where Ali Larijani had previously stated regarding the extension of the snapback deadline that Iran fundamentally does not accept the proposed conditions of the European countries; Tehran believes that such measures could become a destructive cycle, where every six months or every year, under increased pressure, Iran would be forced to extend them. Therefore, from Tehran’s perspective, such an approach is unacceptable.
In this context, Esmail Baqaei, spokesperson for Iran’s foreign ministry, emphasized that Iran does not consider the snapback mechanism legal or reasonable, and at the same time Tehran is in no way seeking to diminish the importance of the consequences of reinstating UN Security Council sanctions against the country due to the activation of the snapback. According to him, “since such a right does not exist and the European parties are not authorized to use this mechanism to reinstate Security Council sanctions, we certainly have a clear plan and have deployed extensive efforts to ensure that such a scenario does not occur.”
Observers have consistently stressed that failure in consultations between Tehran and the three European countries, aimed at extending the snapback mechanism deadline, would not only place Iran but also Europe on a risky path with wide-ranging political, economic, and security consequences in the region and the world, and would completely alter regional diplomacy and security equations.
On this basis, Etemad newspaper, aiming to assess potential scenarios regarding the future of relations between Tehran and the European troika, with a focus on the nuclear file and at the same time Russia’s new card currently on the negotiating table with Europeans, conducted an interview with Morteza Maki, an expert on European affairs.
In his interview with Etemad, Maki emphasized that the Geneva negotiations are probably Iran’s last diplomatic opportunity to prevent the activation of the snapback mechanism. At the same time, he believes that given the strict demands of Europe and the United States and their lack of flexibility, the prospect of success, even with Moscow’s recent initiative, still seems limited.
The full interview is presented below:
Morteza Maki, an expert on European affairs, in response to Etemad’s question regarding the possibility of Europe and Iran returning to the diplomatic track to reach an agreement aimed at postponing the snapback mechanism deadline, emphasized that given the latest political and diplomatic movements between Tehran and the European countries, as well as Iran’s interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the talks on Tuesday between Iranian representatives and senior European officials in Geneva are probably Iran’s last diplomatic opportunity to prevent the activation of the snapback mechanism.
However, considering the demands presented by the Europeans and the responses that the Islamic Republic has provided so far, there is little hope for the success of this round of negotiations. Yet, the last openings of diplomacy always provide the possibility of creating political solutions, and hope for an effective outcome still exists.
According to Maki, the main demand of the European countries from Iran is increased cooperation with the IAEA; a process that Iran has initiated but so far no concrete results have emerged from the recent negotiations between Iranian officials and the Deputy Secretary-General of the safeguards body during his recent visit to Tehran. Even the IAEA officials have not provided a clear stance regarding the outcomes of this visit on which an accurate assessment could be made, indicating that the safeguards body itself remains in a suspended position.
This European affairs expert further told Etemad that the visit of IAEA representatives to Washington is also of special importance and demonstrates the validity of Iran’s criticisms of the agency; because the IAEA, rather than solely fulfilling its technical role as an observer of nuclear facilities, acts in alignment with the U.S. government and European countries. Since no flexibility has been observed so far in the U.S. positions regarding Iran’s nuclear program and they continue to insist on a complete halt to enrichment, the meeting of IAEA officials with the U.S. is not expected to yield a positive outcome for Tehran.
According to Maki, the U.S. even supports the Europeans’ efforts to activate the snapback mechanism, and Marco Rubio, the U.S. Secretary of State, has repeatedly urged Europeans to focus on this process in order to take full advantage of the existing opportunity.
The European affairs expert further emphasized that Iran’s nuclear file has now become a serious challenge for European governments. Unlike during Donald Trump’s early presidency, when Europe resisted Washington’s pressure to activate the snapback mechanism and demonstrated its will to preserve the JCPOA, European countries now have demands similar to those of the U.S. and Israel.
In recent weeks, the Israeli lobby in Tel Aviv and Washington has also been active and is trying to ensure that the opportunity for implementing the snapback mechanism by the three European countries is not missed. However, doubts still remain among European governments regarding taking snapback action, because they know that if the JCPOA is effectively considered over, they will lose their role in Iran’s nuclear file.
This European affairs expert, in response to another question from Etemad regarding the potential consequences of activating the snapback mechanism for Iran and European countries, emphasized: “This action will undoubtedly have extensive political and security consequences for Iran, and its effects are not limited to the country’s borders; it can also influence regional and global equations. Therefore, Iran, as an influential actor in the region, is trying in the remaining time to prevent this scenario from materializing, because the current conditions of the country cannot tolerate the return of UN Security Council sanctions.”
According to Maki, some experts believe that even if Europeans send a letter to the Security Council to initiate the snapback mechanism, Iran has a one-month opportunity for diplomatic intervention and to adopt effective solutions. Meanwhile, the upcoming visit of Masoud Pezeshkian, Iran’s president of the parliament, to New York could be a golden opportunity to prevent the activation of the snapback mechanism.
Maki, in response to another question from Etemad regarding the consequences of snapback activation at the regional and international levels, stated that this action represents one of the serious challenges facing Iranian diplomacy. In this scenario, Tehran has few tools to counter the reinstatement of Security Council sanctions. Responses such as withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or suspension of cooperation with it are on Iran’s agenda, although suspension of cooperation is a better option than full withdrawal, because in the case of suspension, space and opportunities for political and diplomatic actions and dialogue to manage the crisis remain.
The foreign policy expert further emphasized in his interview with Etemad that activating the snapback mechanism practically legitimizes previous U.S. and European sanctions and challenges Iran’s cooperation with neighbors and strategic allies, including China and Russia. Furthermore, this action could lead to Iran returning under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and turning the country into a threat to international peace and security, providing legitimacy to Israel and U.S. threats against Tehran.
According to Maki, the more important point is that one of Israel’s motives for pressuring Europeans and the U.S. is to gain international legitimacy for military actions against Iran, and the activation of the snapback mechanism will push the region into an unstable environment, potentially forcing Tehran to take actions that are not stabilizing and may be perceived as causing regional instability.
However, as Mr. Pezeshkian emphasized in his contact with his Russian counterpart, Iran is not seeking to build nuclear weapons, and any response to the activation of the snapback should not be interpreted as weapon development.
This European affairs expert further told Etemad: “Therefore, any action by Iran must be carried out with a precise calculation of costs and benefits; as Mr. Larijani previously emphasized, the effectiveness of decisions is decisive. Note that after Russia’s attack on Ukraine, the security equations in Europe and the U.S. have changed, and European countries are strengthening their defense capabilities and even increasing their nuclear capacities, an action that shows the NPT no longer holds the same position, and nuclear diplomacy today is fundamentally different from the past. Therefore, threatening to withdraw from this treaty in the event of snapback activation cannot be a viable solution either.”
This European affairs expert continued, responding to another Etemad question regarding the possibility of flexibility in Iran’s positions before the activation of the snapback mechanism, and noted: “The issue of extending UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is one of the sensitive axes of diplomatic negotiations between Iran and Europe. In this context, Tehran’s agreement to a six-month postponement of this resolution could weaken Iran’s legal arguments regarding the illegality of European actions to reinstate sanctions.
Currently, Iran believes that Europeans have no basis to use this capacity, as the Islamic Republic has not violated any obligations and has halted its nuclear activities in accordance with the suspension of counterpart obligations stated in Resolution 2231. According to Maki, Iran’s suspension of safeguards-related activities was a response to the repeated violations of counterpart obligations, and Tehran has repeatedly emphasized that if Europe and the U.S. return to their commitments, Iran will resume its cooperation.
On the other hand, over the past years, European obligations have not been implemented economically or politically. Even during Trump’s first administration, Europeans showed no will to revive these commitments. Therefore, accepting a six-month postponement from Iran would challenge the credibility of Tehran’s legal arguments.
The international affairs expert continued, discussing other possible measures that Tehran might accept, including a temporary suspension of enrichment, and said that recent statements by Ali Larijani about suspending nuclear activities recall experiences repeated in Iran-Europe negotiations over the past two decades. Between 2003 and 2005, Iran temporarily suspended its nuclear program following the Saadabad Agreement, and Europeans had the opportunity to propose a practical solution for Iran’s right to enrichment, but they did not fulfill their obligations, and Iran resumed its nuclear program.
Now too, if a six-month suspension does not create a breakthrough, it only postpones the crisis, and these six months will be a golden opportunity for Europeans to exploit political and security pressure tools against Iran.
Maki further told Etemad: “Moreover, there is an alleged perception among Europeans that Iran is in its weakest political, economic, and security condition, and they will certainly try to use this situation to impose their demands. Therefore, these six months can only be considered an opportunity to change equations if there is real flexibility in Europe’s and the U.S.’s positions. Accordingly, despite the hope of some that Iran might accept the extension of Resolution 2231 at the last minute, the statements of Araqchi and Larijani indicate that Tehran will not retreat from its positions.”
Responding to another Etemad question regarding the possible six-month postponement of the snapback mechanism deadline and its results for Iran, Maki emphasized: “In recent discussions regarding the extension of Resolution 2231, two main currents—supporters and opponents of extending the deadline—have different arguments. The reformist camp and other groups in favor of extending the deadline believe that at this stage, Iran should show greater flexibility in its nuclear program and take a step back.
Supporters of extending Resolution 2231 believe that this retreat aims to neutralize some serious threats against the country, even if its effects are only visible in the short- or medium-term. According to Maki, supporters see this opportunity as allowing Tehran to make use of new initiatives and also to provide a basis for offering new diplomatic initiatives, and perhaps Tehran can achieve some of its demands through these means.
However, this European affairs expert also emphasized that we should not forget that given the demands of the U.S. and Europe, including a complete halt to enrichment and missile restrictions, even a six-month extension of the resolution could increase political pressures on Iran.”
Therefore, making the right decision at this stage—before the possible six-month suspension period begins—can have a greater impact in the long term. This European affairs expert further told Etemad: “Nevertheless, the European side’s agreement to hold a new round of negotiations between Iranian and European representatives shows that they still believe in opportunities to find solutions or initiatives. On the other hand, legal experts consider even the one-month interval between Europeans sending a letter to the Security Council and the Council’s final decision to activate the snapback as an important opportunity for Iran; a timeframe that could be a turning point, especially during Mr. Pezeshkian’s visit to New York, where Tehran and Washington could resolve this issue.”
Maki continued: “Experience has shown that in critical and final moments, the country is forced to make decisions with high costs, and many opportunities have already been lost. If Europeans decide to activate the snapback mechanism, Iran must manage the crisis within this limited window to reduce the impact of this action.”
This foreign policy expert, responding to another Etemad question regarding Russia’s recent draft resolution in the UN Security Council and its potential impact on extending the snapback mechanism deadline, explained: “It is not expected that this Russian initiative will yield significant practical results, because the approval of this draft depends on obtaining the consensus of at least four permanent members of the Security Council. Only if the agreement of the other four members is obtained can one hope that the diplomatic path to exit the complex and emergency situation in which Iran finds itself will be provided.
Nevertheless, the likelihood of European countries and the United States agreeing to this draft is very low, as they primarily seek to use the snapback mechanism to advance their political objectives against Iran and ensure the continuation of comprehensive sanctions. Maki further emphasized that this Russian action is symbolic and reflects Moscow’s supportive and empathetic approach toward the political pressures on Tehran. However, the chances of the Russian draft achieving practical results and creating a tangible change in the current equations are still considered limited and weak.”
