SAEDNEWS: The Foreign Minister, responding to some criticisms of his performance, says: 'We have used the full extent of the powers we had and carried out planning. Pre-war negotiations were designed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and within the specified framework, we were able to proceed.'
According to the political service of SaedNews, nearly a year has passed since Seyed Abbas Araghchi assumed the position of Foreign Minister in the 14th government. Over the past more than three hundred days, Iran and the West Asia region have experienced an unprecedented series of developments. The assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the late head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, in Tehran—at a time when Araghchi’s presence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not yet been officially approved by parliamentary confidence—was indicative of a year full of events. That year continued with direct aggression by the Israeli regime, with the support, consultation, and collusion of the United States against Iran. The U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities was effectively a direct strike on the indirect Iran-U.S. negotiations hosted by the Sultanate of Oman. Today, although the military aggression against Iran has ceased, the halted Iran-U.S. negotiations have not resumed, and Iran’s relations with Europe are also experiencing tense days under the shadow of the European troika’s threat to activate the automatic snapback mechanism of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran.
On the eve of Government Week and one year after the start of the 14th government, in IRNA’s program ‘Diplomacy Table,’ we hosted Seyed Abbas Araghchi and asked him about the latest status of negotiations for sanctions relief, the controversies surrounding his one-year performance, and, of course, some important regional files, including the Gaza war, relations with Syria and Lebanon, and the outcome of relations with the Taliban’s government in Afghanistan. (Read the first part of IRNA’s interview with the Foreign Minister regarding the President’s current trip to Armenia here.)
One year after the start of the 14th government, it has gone through more than 300 eventful days. The policy line of the 14th government in foreign affairs was more or less clear, but Mr. Pezeshkian recently made statements explaining why the government supports negotiations to resolve disputes, which have faced sharp reactions. As the Foreign Minister of this cabinet, how do you describe the government’s approach in foreign policy, especially after the war?
The approach of the 14th government is clear. We have sought to increase diplomatic interactions, especially in the region and with neighboring countries. We have never shied away from diplomatic engagement with Western countries, including the United States, and negotiations with the U.S. on the nuclear issue. In this regard, we planned and even acted. Everyone witnessed that we had five rounds of negotiation, which ultimately led to war. In other words, our approach has been to use negotiation and diplomacy as tools in foreign relations and to strengthen this approach.
I repeat here a sentence I have said many times, so there is no misunderstanding: both negotiation and war are tools that governments choose to achieve their objectives. Negotiation and diplomacy are lower-cost and lower-risk approaches, but sometimes their cost can exceed that of war. War is usually a costly route, but in some cases, it is less costly than a negotiation that results in surrender. Therefore, neither of these two tools has inherent sanctity, nor does either have inherent corruption. Everything depends on the circumstances and which tool you choose to apply.
Both negotiation and war are tools that governments choose to achieve their objectives. Negotiation and diplomacy are lower-cost and lower-risk approaches, but sometimes their cost can exceed that of war. War is usually a costly path, but in some cases, it is less costly than a negotiation that leads to surrender. In certain situations, one must fight; if one does not fight, it is considered a loss, and national interests are ignored. In other circumstances, one should not fight, because it would impose unnecessary costs on the country. Sometimes one must negotiate and solve national problems through dialogue. And sometimes, negotiation should be avoided, especially when it may lead to surrender, humiliation, or undermining a country’s dignity. This is particularly true when the country’s sovereignty is threatened and the opposing side seeks through negotiation what it could not achieve through war.
These are matters that must be decided case by case. The 14th government is fully committed to the principle that Iran’s national interests and the supreme welfare of the Iranian people determine what actions must be taken at any given time. Just as we fought in war with seriousness, strength, and authority, resisted, and witnessed the results, if necessary, we will also stand in negotiation with the same strength and authority to safeguard the country’s interests. As we resisted in war, we have also resisted in negotiation. When the opposing side in the negotiation was frustrated from imposing demands contrary to Iran’s interests and security, it turned to its next tool.
We entered negotiations, but we did not compromise on the interests of the Iranian people or the rights of the nation. This is our principle. Dr. Pezeshkian has also consistently emphasized this point. Of course, his language is his own, and people voted for him using this language. From my perspective, it stems from his sincerity and connection to the people. He speaks in his own words, and we in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs speak in ours. But the essence of the matter and our principle in foreign policy is to use diplomatic tools wherever necessary and not to miss the opportunities diplomacy provides. One should not adopt an all-or-nothing perspective on negotiation or war; the belief that war is always sacred and negotiation always corrupt and to be avoided is incorrect and unrealistic.
Can we speak of a good and acceptable alignment between the expert opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and government decision-making in foreign policy over the past year?
Certainly. But when we speak of decision-making in foreign policy, another point arises. When it comes to approaches, tactics, and executive conduct, the government acts directly. But foreign policy decision-making is a sovereign matter, not merely a governmental one. The entire sovereignty decides, and the government, in general, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in particular, execute the policies decided at the level of sovereignty.
When discussing approaches, tactics, and executive conduct, the government acts directly. But foreign policy decision-making is a sovereign matter, not merely a governmental one. This is entirely obvious and works the same way in all countries. In Iran, it is also the case and has been emphasized repeatedly. The Supreme Leader has explicitly stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—not only in Iran but in all countries—implements decisions made at the sovereign level.
Of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government play their role in the process of policy-making and decision-making, expressing their opinions and perspectives, but ultimately, once a decision is made, everyone is bound by it, whether they voted for it or not. After that, the decision is collective, and all must follow it.
From this perspective, both the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have always been executors of the system’s decisions made at the highest level. Ultimately, sovereignty is represented by the Supreme National Security Council; this council has its own procedure for decision-making, and once a decision is taken, everyone must comply. Reason dictates that when a decision is made collectively, all implement it. No one can say, 'I opposed this decision, so I will not execute it.' If someone does not want to implement it, they can resign and step aside. But as long as they hold responsibility, they must execute the system’s supreme decisions.
In recent months, you have been consistently defending negotiations that were conducted indirectly, and at the same time, you have provided reasoning for why those negotiations were beneficial. Part of society’s question is: after that 12-day war, when you look back, do you think there was a way through diplomacy to prevent the military aggression of the Zionist regime?
That is exactly what we were doing. Over the past year, or as you put it, in the past 300 days, we faced a wartime atmosphere. Perhaps even before this 12-day war, we came close to war at least three other times. How much the public understood this is a separate discussion. I believe people knew what the situation was like. During those periods, diplomacy was active and played its role.
Could you please explain what the diplomatic apparatus actually did during those three periods? Because so far, I haven’t seen any reference to it. Was it our regional diplomacy that played a major role?
Our regional diplomacy was very effective. I remember that in a short period, I traveled to almost all the countries in the region, and a collective understanding developed that war benefits no one, and if the war spreads in the region, it could cause devastating losses for all countries in the region. This is precisely the goal of the Zionist regime: to prevent any country in the region from becoming strong. They want the region weak, divided, and fragmented. We must not allow the Zionist regime to achieve this goal and spread the fire of war in the region.
It is not only diplomacy that can prevent war. It is the combination of a country’s powers that creates deterrence. Diplomacy is essentially the language of a country’s power, not the power itself. Power is established when successful diplomacy converts the components of a country’s power into security and interests. This, in my view, was the understanding created in the region, and the contacts and lobbying conducted by regional countries, along with our own follow-ups, during different phases, pushed back, delayed, and limited the war. Even during the 12-day war, I believe our diplomacy succeeded in keeping the war’s scope narrower than it could have been. This was due to diplomatic work.
But I must also mention another point: see, it is not only diplomacy that can prevent war. It is the combination of a country’s powers that creates deterrence. Diplomacy is essentially the language of a country’s power, not the power itself. Power is established when successful diplomacy converts the components of a country’s power into security and interests.
Therefore, when examining the cause of a war or the absence of one, we must consider the full set of a country’s power components. Even in the times when war did not occur and our policy was active in the region, I do not attribute it solely to diplomacy, but also to the capability of our armed forces to respond strongly, which prevented war. In the war itself, it was this capability that led to the war’s end. Of course, diplomacy was effective, but it was truly the powerful response capability of the Islamic Republic that made the enemy despair of continuing the war.
All the enemy’s efforts in the early days of the war were aimed at destroying this capability: they martyred commanders or hit specific centers to reduce our response capability, but they did not succeed. Since they failed, after 12 days, they realized the inflicted blows were unbearable, and therefore, they were the ones who requested a ceasefire. So diplomacy has its place and role, but essentially, it is the continuation of the country’s combination of powers that leads to transformation.
Can I conclude from your statements that you do not think diplomacy at that time could have done more to prevent the war?
Sometimes war is inevitable, whether through diplomacy or other sets of factors. Ultimately, the situation becomes such that you are forced to fight. The negotiations that took place—America insisted on achieving a demand that, from our perspective, was impossible.
The U.S. demand from the beginning was that Iran should not have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Some convinced them that even with enrichment, this capability would always exist, and therefore, their demand effectively became “zero enrichment.”
Zero enrichment?
Yes. We resisted this demand, and when they became disappointed in achieving it through negotiation, they turned toward military attack.
Was this U.S. demand raised from the first and second sessions, or did it appear in the third and fourth sessions? Some believe this demand was not in the first and second sessions and suddenly appeared as a maximal demand in the third session.
No, the U.S. demand from the beginning was that Iran should not have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Some convinced them that even with enrichment, this capability would always exist, and therefore, their demand effectively became “zero enrichment.” They had this demand from the first day and the first round of negotiations. Of course, during the negotiations, we sometimes tried to show them that achieving the no-nuclear-weapons goal does not necessarily conflict with enrichment. Our policy is firm; based on our fatwa, principles, and beliefs, we do not want nuclear weapons, but we want enrichment—both for our own needs and as a right we have and must exercise, as well as a valuable scientific achievement we attained ourselves. At times, some proposals could have worked, but when these proposals went to Washington, their decision would change again. It was clear that a stronger lobby in Washington influenced them.
So the Iranian negotiation team had operational plans on the table? Some believe that perhaps Iran’s negotiation design was not proper.
Yes, we had several operational plans to create a compromise between enrichment and non-possession of weapons. These plans were considered during the negotiations, and willingness was shown, but when they went to Washington, there were people who convinced them to insist on “zero enrichment.” I think a much stronger lobby in Washington existed that imposed this demand on the Americans. Otherwise, the Americans—or at least our negotiators—were ready to reach intermediary formulas.
Mr. Minister, you have critics on both sides of the field and diplomacy: people who believe you were politically optimistic, both in the five rounds of negotiations and in some other positions, and groups who think you have become overly cautious. Especially, some statements from prominent figures you have worked with were made in the past month, saying that the Foreign Minister should be given more authority. Tell the people clearly: are your hands tied?
I have previously answered this; the system’s decisions are made beyond the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry is the executor of these decisions. In implementing these decisions, we have freedom, and during decision-making, we can also present our opinions and analyses, which is fully possible. But when a decision is made, the executor cannot then say, “I want freedom to act however I want.” This is inconsistent with any rule—neither reason, logic, governance principles, nor organizational order allows it. It is like in the army, when a decision is made for an operation, a soldier cannot stand in the middle of the war and say, “I do not accept this operation, and I will act however I like.”
In implementing the system’s decisions, we have freedom, and during decision-making, we can present our opinions and analyses, which is fully possible. I believe that within the scope of the Foreign Minister’s responsibilities and authorities, we have had and still have full authority. Right now, we are effectively present in decision-making, and indeed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ analyses have been influential, and our opinions have been considered.
Has your ministry made you conservative? This question includes many criticisms directed at you as well. You have probably seen it mentioned online that Mr. Araqchi, Deputy Foreign Minister and head of the negotiation team during the JCPOA era, has become more conservative during his ministerial tenure?
What is the difference between a deputy minister and a minister? Whether you are a deputy minister or a minister, you operate within a framework. Those friends who make such claims have themselves experienced similar situations and realized that the Foreign Minister specifically, and the government generally, cannot pursue every path they personally deem fit in foreign policy. The paths and decisions are made within the governance system, which is above the government, and we are obliged to operate within that framework.
Do you agree that what distinguishes foreign ministers is implementation? That is, not all the credit can be given to decision-making and policy formulation. In any case, we have had different foreign ministers, and what distinguished their performance was partly this type of implementation. I want you to answer here: are you conservative in execution? That is, do you refrain from using some of the powers you have?
No, that is not the case. We have used the full set of powers we had and carried out the necessary planning. Pre-war negotiations were designed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and we were able to move forward within the defined framework. This framework does not allow you to take any position you want in negotiations because the objective of the negotiation is clear, and you cannot act outside that goal. This cannot be called "caution"; it is a duty.
Is the design of negotiations after the war still within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
Yes, of course. As always, from the first day the negotiations began, decision-making occurs in the Supreme National Security Council, and implementation is done by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In implementation, the Ministry designs who to negotiate with, how, where, and what the negotiation strategy is; from where to start and to what endpoint to reach. In this regard, someone may or may not find fault with us; our strength and weakness lie in this implementation. But the overall policy, the range in which it can move, how far it can go forward or back, is all decided by the Supreme National Security Council.
In one of your recent interviews, you mentioned that the public should not be kept in a state of doubt, uncertainty, constant tension, and anxiety about the possible resumption of war. Before the JCPOA in 2015 and even afterward, when we spoke about the impact of foreign policy on people’s lives, this was mostly limited to the effect of sanctions on their livelihoods. But today, here, we are talking about the impact of diplomacy on preventing a renewed war or keeping its shadow away from people’s lives. Surely, in conversations that ordinary people have with you, this concern and question arise: will war happen again? In any case, one cannot easily remove people’s worries with words alone. With the cessation of war, it seems that one of the public’s expectations is the resumption of negotiations with the same parameters that were previously discussed. But it seems that during this period we have fallen into a deadlock. Why can’t we get out of this negotiation deadlock? What initiatives has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs taken in this regard?
Where I said that the uncertainty has, so to speak, its own damage for the country, it was in a discussion about the psychological war that accompanies the real war. The real war is now stopped, but the psychological war has not stopped, and they try to impose the same demands that they had in the real war on society psychologically. Through interpretations, analyses, and various movements, they maintain in society the sense that today there will be war, tomorrow there will be war. What I meant then, and still mean, is that we should not fall into the psychological space that the enemy is trying to create for us. We have a real war, a media war, a psychological war, and a political war; in all of these, caution must be exercised.
In a recent interview, I also said, perhaps I am mistaken, but my feeling is that an unusual anxiety, tension, and uncertainty is being injected into our society more than it should be, and we should not allow this injection to happen. This does not mean that we should be careless about preventing war, nor does it mean that we should neglect the necessary precautions, but it does mean that we should not fall to the other extreme.
Weren’t we negotiating, yet war happened? So negotiation does not necessarily prevent war. We must be prepared from all directions. What prevents war is preparedness for war. If your enemies sense that you are not ready to fight, they will impose war upon you.
Another point is that in my discussion about the sanctity of war and negotiations, I should have added—and I do now—that some people fall to one extreme in diplomacy and war; they always see negotiation as good and the solution to everything and always see war as bad. I repeat again: where you must fight, you must fight; and where you should not fight, you should not fight. Negotiation is the same. The notion that because there is a possibility of war, we must go negotiate, the answer is: weren’t we negotiating, yet war happened? So negotiation does not necessarily prevent war. We must be prepared from all directions. What prevents war is preparedness for war. If your enemies sense that you are not ready to fight, they will impose war upon you. Preparedness for war should also not lead to anxiety or agitation for war. This management is a very skillful task that all country officials in political, economic, psychological, and media sectors must pay attention to. We must neither allow society to fall into anxiety and tension nor indulge in unrealistic optimism and wishful thinking. We have plans for negotiation now, but let us understand that this does not mean that negotiation can prevent war. Our recent experience, only a month or two ago, shows this.
However, the negotiations we are planning or have conducted include one with the International Atomic Energy Agency. We made the first contact with the Agency after the so-called war. The visit of Mr. Aparo, the Deputy Director-General of the Agency, took place. We told the Agency that new conditions have arisen: our facilities were bombed, and there is no precedent for how to deal with bombed facilities. On the other hand, parliamentary law imposes certain obligations that restrict our actions in some cases, and the procedure has been authorized through the Supreme National Security Council. Therefore, we must first sit together to reach a framework, modality, or new cooperation structure and, based on that, start cooperation.
Ultimately, the snapback may also be activated; I do not deny this. We have been working on this issue with China and Russia for several years now.
Was any progress made during this visit?
Mr. Aparo’s visit, in order for us to reach a better understanding on this matter, was, in my opinion, beneficial. After this visit, we documented and submitted our set of views regarding a possible modality based on parliamentary law. On Saturday, 25 Mordad [August 16], the Agency documented its views and returned them to us, and this back-and-forth interaction between us and the Agency continues. Our colleagues will probably be dispatched to Vienna to hold another round of negotiations there.
The return of inspectors will be possible based on parliamentary law, that is, with the approval of the Supreme National Security Council. I would like to give an example to make it clear to all people. We cannot completely cut cooperation with the Agency. For instance, in about a month or a month and a half, it will be time to refuel the Bushehr power plant, and this refueling must take place in the presence of Agency inspectors; therefore, inspections must happen so that we can perform this task. Even the Russian officials of the plant tell us to expedite this work so that it can be done; otherwise, according to regulations, we cannot proceed. This is one of the issues that must be specified in the modality.
Mr. Aparo’s visit, in order for us to reach a better understanding on this matter, was, in my opinion, beneficial. After this visit, we documented and submitted our set of views regarding a possible modality based on parliamentary law. On Saturday, 25 Mordad [August 16], the Agency documented its views and returned them to us.
Another point is that, in principle, the Agency submits its request for inspections of facilities that have not been bombed to us. We then forward this request to the Supreme National Security Council, and the Council decides under what conditions inspections are permitted. This must be done, and we must plan for it. Therefore, it is not as if we say that we are completely cutting cooperation with the Agency. If, one day, the system decides to withdraw from the NPT, then it will do so. For now, however, we have decided to remain in the NPT. I mention this as an example and it should not be assumed that this debate is ongoing or non-existent; it may arise in the future.
Yes, we have not yet reached that point. Cutting cooperation with the Agency is one of the consequences of withdrawing from the NPT; one cannot remain inside the NPT and not perform this cooperation. That is, one would pay the cost of withdrawal but practically remain inside.
At this stage, will not cooperating with the Agency also contribute more to the “securitization” of Iran’s file?
This is both correct and subject to certain considerations. Cutting cooperation with the Agency has its own consequences, and continuing cooperation in the same way as before is no longer possible. My question to the Agency is: what specific protocol exists for inspecting a bombed nuclear facility? The Agency itself has no answer because such a precedent does not exist. A facility registered with the Agency that was engaged in peaceful nuclear activities has been bombed; now the question is, how should it be inspected? The Agency has no precedent in this regard and cannot provide a specific protocol, such as referring to a particular clause of the Safeguards Agreement. Therefore, negotiation is required, and in some ways, this is not easily achievable.
Given recent experience, there is undoubtedly new security and safety considerations for us. Under current conditions, even approaching these facilities may have its own risks. Therefore, until these matters are clarified, the possibility of resuming cooperation does not exist. This new cooperation with the Agency will certainly not be like before, especially since, according to parliamentary law, all matters must be pursued through the Supreme National Security Council, which decides where and how inspections will be conducted or not.
Regarding the design of negotiations after the Agency issue, what are the next steps you mentioned?
We also have contacts with the Europeans.
Do these contacts resemble “negotiation for negotiation’s sake”? Multiple meetings are held, but it does not seem that any particular success has been achieved.
The term “negotiation for negotiation’s sake” can have two meanings: one, negotiation merely for the sake of negotiating, for example, to respond to public opinion or to waste time, which is usually how this term is used. The second meaning is that negotiation is held to determine the method of negotiation.
At present, with the Europeans, we are at a stage where we are assessing whether there is fundamentally a basis for real negotiation and serious exchange between us and them.
Do you think the Europeans view these negotiations differently, as you mentioned?
No, they are even more concerned about this issue than we are. In meetings with European parties, their emphasis has also been on this matter: we must see on what basis we can enter negotiations. In one of the meetings, I asked them to provide a reason why we should negotiate with you. Which sanction or threat can you remove or resolve?
Yes, currently the only tool they think they have is the snapback. We have clearly explained our position to them: first, you do not fundamentally have the right to use the snapback, because after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and your recent positions—including the “zero enrichment” issue—you have effectively exited the JCPOA yourselves. Therefore, you are no longer recognized as a participant in the JCPOA, and the snapback right belongs only to the remaining members.
Second, even if we assume you have the right to use the snapback, what will happen if you do? First, Europe’s role in the diplomatic process ends completely; you have used a tool, and it is over. What remains afterward? The end of diplomacy?
Return to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the potential return of arms sanctions, are serious issues, and we must not allow such a process to take place. Efforts are ongoing in this regard. However, Europe must understand that if it takes such an action, it does not put us in a difficult position. I asked them this question explicitly. When they said that little time remains for diplomacy, I asked whether they meant that after using the snapback, diplomacy would end. They had no answer. It is clear that diplomacy will not end, but Europe will no longer have a role. Europe has drawn its sword and lowered it. Now, if this happens, what will occur? For example, the reinstatement of previous Security Council resolutions. Yes, I also agree that we must not allow this to happen because it is undesirable. But this return no longer has the same importance or impact.
Resolution 1929 was very dangerous, but now Resolution 2231 is in force, which is a more desirable resolution. Nevertheless, has 2231 been able to prevent war or halt sanctions? No. The reality is that the Security Council and its resolutions no longer have the same effect for either them or us.
Again, I emphasize that these developments have consequences and should not be underestimated. For example, returning to Chapter VII of the UN Charter or the potential reinstatement of arms sanctions are serious matters, and we must not allow such a process to occur. Efforts are underway in this regard. However, Europe must understand that if it takes such an action, it does not put us in a difficult position.
Have we still not reached a negotiation basis with Europe?
No, we have not reached such a basis yet. Of course, it is possible that in the coming days there will be a session regarding this. The Europeans themselves have realized that using the snapback at present brings no benefit either for them or for others.
And they proposed the extension of 2231.
Yes. Well, when we believe that they do not have the right to implement the snapback, it is natural that they also do not have the right to extend it. Our position is that they are not in a position or status to make any decisions regarding the snapback, whether about its implementation or its extension.
Could Iran agree to the extension under certain conditions? To prevent, in your words, the reinstatement of Security Council resolutions? Have you considered that perhaps one solution is for Iran to put its own conditions on the table?
(laughing) Now you are giving negotiation guidelines?
No. But the probability of activating the snapback is high, and then people may ask why the Foreign Minister said Europe had no right, yet we see it happening. Like the JCPOA, where it was said that the probability of the U.S. withdrawal was very low, yet it eventually withdrew.
Look, when I say Europe has no right, I mean legally, politically, and morally, they have no such right.
But adherence to any of these is practically nonexistent.
Yes, the snapback may ultimately be activated; I do not deny this. We have been working with China and Russia on this issue for several years. We have held multiple joint sessions and designed a set of actions together to implement if the snapback is activated. Regarding the solution to ultimately prevent the snapback, discussions have been held among the three countries and some measures are considered, although we may not succeed.
The first point is that they do not have the right to take this action, but this does not mean I say, “You have this right.” Our position is clear: they do not have such a right.
The second point is that if the snapback occurs, it will have political and strategic consequences for us, but it does not mean the end of diplomacy or the end of everything.
The third point, which I think needs to respond to a common misconception in society, is that activating the snapback will not have more economic impact than the current situation.
No. Its economic impact will not exceed the current situation. No new sanctions beyond what currently exist will be imposed. I see that many people, or even some officials, think that if the snapback is activated, sanctions will return. My question is: which sanctions? The Security Council’s economic sanctions are far more limited than the current unilateral U.S. sanctions.
The consequences of the snapback are indeed serious and heavy, but …
Currently, some countries cooperate with us economically because these sanctions are unilateral and they say they do not recognize them. If these sanctions fall under the Security Council’s authority, don’t you think that even some of our friendly Eastern countries would become anxious in their interactions with us?
No, my point is exactly this: the effect of the snapback is more psychological than real. We have had this discussion; it was said that some countries might say they will stop buying oil due to the snapback. Our response is that the Security Council resolutions had no connection to our oil or banks and many other sanction areas. This is why the U.S. moved to unilateral sanctions. But why is this effective in the psychological space? Because it may exacerbate uncertainty inside the country, and outside, some governments may feel that conditions have worsened. This psychological space must be addressed.
I have raised this issue in several places, and some accuse me of downplaying the consequences of the snapback, which is not true. The consequences of the snapback are indeed serious and heavy, and efforts must be made to prevent it. But at the same time, it should not be exaggerated. We should not assume that the activation of the snapback will impose heavier or new economic sanctions that we cannot withstand. It will not. Conditions will not be worse than the current situation. Yes, there are consequences psychologically, politically, and even strategically, but not to the extent that it blocks diplomacy or paralyzes the country.
How close are we to resuming negotiations with the U.S.?
Negotiations with the U.S. must take place at the right time. Every negotiation has a specific timing, which is called the “negotiation maturity,” and it must reach that maturity before it occurs. In my opinion, we have not yet reached that point of maturity for an effective negotiation with the U.S. I think the Americans have also not reached a point where they would enter an equal negotiation. Even if they seek negotiation, they want to take through the negotiation table what they could not achieve militarily, and they will not succeed. I will not enter a negotiation where the rights of the Iranian nation, which they bombed but could not destroy, are ignored. They have failed to create a reassuring point that Iran will never enrich again because they could not obtain our signature at the negotiation table to prevent it. That is not a negotiation.
Does the Islamic Republic of Iran have any preconditions for starting negotiations? Some recent interviews interpreted that you have preconditions, such as compensation—are these preconditions or negotiation topics?
These are negotiation topics. My interview with the Financial Times was mis-titled. In that interview, I said that if negotiations start, one of our topics will be compensation and damages, but I did not say it is a precondition. It cannot be a precondition because compensation and damages themselves require negotiation. You cannot sit at home and expect damages to be handed to you; you have to negotiate to receive them. Their scope and size have many ups and downs, and it is possible they will not agree. It must be discussed. Therefore, it is not a precondition, but it will be one of the negotiation topics.
What about the other side? Have intermediaries told you that the Americans have specific demands, and if accepted, they will come to the negotiation table?
Let me state a fact: we receive conflicting messages through intermediaries. There are also conflicting messages in the interviews and statements of the American side. One of our problems, both during previous negotiations and now, is that we have not heard a coherent statement from the Americans. The talks keep changing, and the messages we receive are contradictory. Sometimes the messages differ from each other, and sometimes the messages differ from the interviews. I think there may not yet be a final summary on the American side, and perhaps they are stuck on other points.
Media speculation has suggested that the intermediary or host of Iran-U.S. negotiations might change. Do you confirm this?
In diplomacy, anything is always possible.
You mean both sides might move toward selecting another host?
The choice of host must be based on the agreement of both sides. No one can impose that a specific intermediary must be used. Intermediaries can also play different roles; some are stronger in one area and weaker in another. Whether a new negotiation occurs still through Oman or a new intermediary is chosen, no final conclusion has been reached.
On the eve of the fourth anniversary of the fall of the republic in Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban, how close do you think the Islamic Republic of Iran is to recognizing the current caretaker government? Are the preconditions we previously stated, namely forming an inclusive government, still on the table?
We are still distant from recognition, but the reality is that we have close cooperation with the Taliban and the existing government, for a very clear reason: the national interests of the Iranian people. Iran shares about a 1000-kilometer border with Afghanistan, and we face numerous challenges—from migrants to drugs, border security, terrorism in Afghanistan, water issues, trade between the two countries, the Persian language, and the security of people, especially the security of Shias. In other words, we have about eight to ten major challenges, and we cannot ignore them. Attention to these matters requires dialogue with the present government in Afghanistan, and discussions and negotiations are ongoing. Therefore, diplomacy between us is active. I personally traveled to Kabul, and more trips have been and will be conducted by my colleagues. Various ministries also send their officials there. These issues, along with many others, are always on our agenda. But we have not yet reached a point where we can officially recognize them.
Has the ruling authority come closer to the points Iran expects for formalizing the relationship, or do you think the Taliban are still distant?
In the challenges I mentioned, we have made good progress in some and not in others. For example, our border security over the past four years has improved compared to before. It is a fact that the Taliban government in Afghanistan has maintained security well; not 100%, but well. Regarding Shias, their security has been maintained, but in recent years, their rights were not fully respected. Regarding water, the situation has improved but is still below our expectations. Trade is ongoing well, but the banking issue has not been resolved. Regarding migrants, cooperation has occurred for their return, and the Afghan side has cooperated. They had three requests, which I think were reasonable: first, that returns should not be in bulk, which is correct so that they can absorb it; second, that it be conducted with dignity, which is reasonable and we comply here; third, that when their assets are returned, e.g., any claims, they are respected. Many of them had rented homes here and need to recover their deposits. The landlords cannot immediately pay; they must gather the money. Therefore, claims must be respected, and our Ministry of Interior monitors this carefully, now more than before. Currently, an understanding exists between us and them; about one million have returned, and no crisis has occurred on either side. In summary, we have challenges; in some we have advanced well, in others we still have problems. Some are in an intermediate state, and I think the current level of neighborly cooperation is acceptable.
It seems that the Syria file is currently at a standstill. Recently, one of our senior officials traveled to Lebanon, and issues arose regarding the refusal to grant permission for his flight to use Syrian airspace. Where do you think the main problem lies, and is there political will to resume relations between Iran and Syria?
The reality is that we are in no hurry to resume relations. The current situation in Syria is very difficult, and the country faces multiple problems. There is the possibility of fragmentation, civil war, and ethnic conflicts, and economic issues also pose major challenges. We have no intention to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs, and establishing political relations is not an immediate priority for us. Whenever the Syrian government concludes that cooperation with Iran is in its interest, we are ready to consider it.
We are in no hurry to resume relations. The current situation in Syria is very difficult, and the country faces multiple problems. There is the possibility of fragmentation, civil war, and ethnic conflicts, and economic issues also pose major challenges.
So far, we have received no signals from any side, and we are waiting for suitable conditions to establish relations. Regarding Dr. Larijani’s flight from Baghdad to Beirut, the chosen route may have been due to security or other factors. I did not ask whether a permission request to fly over Syria was made or not, but it is not unlikely that the pilot decided for his own specific reasons to take the route through Turkey to Beirut.
Intermediaries always exist in any field, but currently we prefer to wait until conditions are suitable for establishing contact.
It is natural that there are still differences with Riyadh on some regional issues
Lebanon has been one of the files that, in recent days, has had its share of developments. We also witnessed Mr. Larijani’s visit, which was reportedly aimed at helping to resolve some of these misunderstandings. Apart from the Lebanon issue itself, we have had an upward trajectory in our relationship with Saudi Arabia, in a way taking it out of stagnation. It is said that Saudi Arabia is now active on the Lebanon file as it has been in the last decade. Given the events happening in Lebanon and the possibility that tensions may move toward civil war or unrest spreading to the region, are there consultations or discussions between you and your Saudi counterpart? Do you think Lebanon remains a point of contention between Tehran and Riyadh?
In my view, our relations with Saudi Arabia in recent years, especially in the past year, have made very good progress despite all regional difficulties, and we have at least a better understanding of each other. This does not mean that our differences have been fully resolved. In some issues our differences have lessened, in some they have been resolved, and in others they remain, but we still have disagreements on various regional issues, which is natural.
For example, this year’s Hajj ceremony went very well, and we experienced a pilgrimage without problems. The only challenge was related to the war and the return of pilgrims, and the Saudi government provided very good cooperation for the return of pilgrims from the land border with Iraq, for which we are truly grateful. In other words, the previous spaces of bitterness between us are no longer present. I regularly communicate with the Saudi foreign minister, and whenever necessary, we speak, particularly regarding Gaza and Palestinian issues; we have spoken several times. We have also discussed U.S. threats, U.S. and Israeli attacks, regional issues, and Lebanon and Syria.
This does not mean that we do not have differences. On the contrary, precisely because we have differences, we talk to each other. However, these differences have not led us to artificial competition or hostility, and they should not. Saudi Arabia is a major country in the Islamic world, a regional power like Iran, and regional issues must certainly be resolved through interaction between these two powers and other regional powers. Differences of opinion exist, but there should be no enmity. This is our policy.
We have not interfered in Lebanon’s internal affairs, nor do we intend to. Lebanon’s issues belong to the Lebanese themselves and must be resolved through national dialogue; dialogue between sects and various groups regarding defense matters. Currently, the situation in Lebanon is special, and Saudi Arabia also has an active presence, which we must acknowledge. We are also present; meaning, we do not have a direct field presence, but we express our views as a regional country.
I must emphasize, as I have said before and reiterate now, that we have not interfered in Lebanon’s internal affairs, nor do we intend to. Lebanon’s issues belong to the Lebanese themselves and must be resolved through national dialogue; dialogue between sects and various groups regarding defense matters. But this does not mean that we do not express our views. If we say that we think a matter should be resolved in a certain way, it does not mean that we are interfering. Others also make proposals. If expressing our views is considered interference, then what do we call those who propose ideas and play a role in Lebanon’s political scene? We have expressed our views, including regarding the resistance’s weapons, for which we have a clear position. The resistance’s weapons, I emphasize, are specific to Lebanon and have no presence elsewhere.
Experience over the past few decades has shown that what creates deterrence against Israel and can prevent the ambitious designs of the Zionist regime in the region, in recent decades, has been the resistance’s weapons. That is why they have faced the greatest hostility and have themselves suffered damage, as everyone knows. But if the countries of the region do not understand that the resistance’s weapons are a deterrent against Israeli hegemony, there could be severe consequences for everyone; just as many thought that through normalization of relations they could reach so-called peace with Israel. Now, normalization has occurred for many, and some are next in line. From their perspective, the resistance has also suffered blows, but Israel and Mr. Netanyahu continue to speak of Greater Israel and draw their map from the Nile to the Euphrates. This has begun again. This means that parts of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq are included in the Greater Israel plan.
Could countering this plan become a subject of cooperation between Iran and regional countries?
Certainly, absolutely. We had discussions during my recent trip to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Specifically, we discussed that we must enter dialogue on regional security structures and achieve understanding and cooperation. Very good talks took place.
Experience over the past few decades has shown that what creates deterrence against Israel and can prevent the ambitious designs of the Zionist regime in the region has only been the resistance’s weapons, which is why they have faced the greatest hostility and suffered damage, as everyone knows.
Even the other parties themselves acknowledged that the situation in the region has changed. We now hear, from the countries of the region, the idea that we need a strong region. A strong region can stand up to the regime. Of course, international politics and relations are very complex, and it is not the case that the entire region moves toward cohesion against the regime. After all, many factors are influential. In my opinion, this understanding has emerged, but the current policies of those countries have not changed much.
Over the past year, you have pursued dynamic diplomacy to advocate for the rights of the people of Gaza. Recently, it seems Iran has proposed holding a renewed meeting. These meetings are constantly being held, but unfortunately, Israel’s genocide in Gaza continues. Are there any new initiatives on the table? Could you report on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ actions regarding Gaza?
Regarding Gaza, really no—us, almost all regional countries, and all Islamic countries have done everything politically possible. However, reality tells us that mere political measures are not enough. In contacts I had with some regional countries and when I requested an emergency session of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, I myself said beforehand that I understand the people of Gaza do not need our conferences or our resolutions—they need food—and our conferences do not provide food for them. But in this situation, what else can be done? At least we gather and convey a unified voice to the world. I know this is not sufficient, but it is at least something that can be done.
I was speaking with one of the officials from a regional country, someone who is genuinely concerned. He said we must reluctantly accept that there is no longer such a thing as the Islamic Ummah. Unfortunately, we have to say that the Americans and the Westerners have succeeded in creating this great division among Islamic countries, among the Islamic Ummah. I was speaking with one of the officials from a regional country, someone who is genuinely concerned. He said we must reluctantly accept that there is no longer such a thing as the Islamic Ummah. Of course, I do not fully agree, but this reality has emerged, and the feeling has arisen that the Islamic Ummah can no longer be “activated,” and Islamic countries are not united. How can over a billion people not reasonably and logically counter a small country of three to four million? This is a major question mark. But we all know the answer: the policies implemented in the region.
Nevertheless, in my view, we should not despair. The key to solving the Palestinian issue and the rest of the regional problems lies in the unity and cooperation of the countries in the region. We make our own efforts in this direction and hope that we can achieve success along this path.
Threats may arise, and the other side may seek, through negotiation, to achieve goals they could not attain through war.
