SAEDNEWS: Nosratollah Tajik wrote: Hezbollah is not the PKK that disarms itself by the decision of its leader! Hezbollah’s weapons are an internal necessity, part of an important segment of Lebanon’s political, social, military, and security realities, which have ensured the preservation of the country’s independence!
Nosratollah Tajik, in an article titled “Reasons and Foundations for Hezbollah’s Weapons Legitimacy” in Etemad newspaper, wrote:
Before entering the discussion on the disarmament of Hezbollah and the domestic, regional, and international factors and motives behind it, as well as the objectives of such an action, it is necessary first to address the reasons and the philosophy behind the existence of weapons in Hezbollah’s possession. The main question should be: why did Hezbollah take up arms?! Without considering this issue, one cannot correctly comment on the recent resolution of the Lebanese Council of Ministers in this regard.
Essentially, Hezbollah was formed from the very beginning to arm itself and resist the Zionist occupation. This movement, unlike many other militant groups that initially chose political activity and only later turned to arms due to failing to achieve their goals, was established from the outset with the aim of resisting the occupation of Lebanon and engaging in armed struggle. The existential philosophy of Hezbollah since 1982 has been to arm itself and stand firm against aggression and to expel Israel; this was the time when Israeli forces had advanced to Beirut and, in the silence and inaction of Arab leaders, had occupied the only Arab capital—without Hezbollah yet having been established or giving the occupier any pretext!
Therefore, it can be said that weapons are intertwined with Hezbollah’s identity. These weapons have been used to resist Israel’s repeated aggressions against Lebanon, and the history of Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon has shown that it has never used them for partisan, group, or sectarian interests. Lebanese people have always considered these weapons a national asset.
This is while Lebanese society is a sectarian society, and according to an unwritten agreement and constitution, three sects—Shia, Sunni, and Christian—must maintain a balance of power to ensure security and stability, especially after the fifteen-year civil war in Lebanon (1975–1990). Before this war, Lebanese Shias were considered second-class citizens and had little political or governmental status. The activities of Imam Musa al-Sadr and his associates in previous decades were the first efforts to change this situation.
Despite this, the Shia community in Lebanon remained in a position of double deprivation, in a small but highly geopolitically sensitive country. Moreover, the importance of the Lebanese Shia position is not limited to the Islamic Republic of Iran after the revolution. Even before the revolution, the former Iranian regime paid special attention to relations with the Lebanese Shia community and invested materially and spiritually in it. The presence of Shias in the heart of the Sunni-majority Arab world has always acted as a balancing factor in regional equations, a tool for stability and security, serving Iran’s national interests and geopolitical sphere, and disrupting this balance could have destabilized the entire regional equation.
On the other hand, Lebanon is a country that does not have significant natural resources and played mostly the role of a financial intermediary in the 1960s and 1970s. Therefore, although it is considered an independent nation-state, in reality it has been heavily dependent on foreign aid and is not an independent variable in regional equations but a dependent one, with regional, European, and American countries and rivals playing roles in it! This dependence, coupled with internal fragmentation, has practically caused Lebanon’s policies to be shaped under the influence of foreign powers. This has further fueled instability and the disruption of internal balance, and as soon as balancing factors weaken, hegemonic factions seek domination. Among these, a segment of Christians with close ties to Israel for domestic purposes plays a prominent role.
Considering these conditions, it can be said that Hezbollah’s weapons are not a secondary or added socio-political factor, but an essential element in Lebanon’s internal balance and national security structure—an element that has so far served the deterrence and stability of the country.
Given these assumptions, if we turn to the recent decision of the Lebanese Council of Ministers, it must be said that this resolution has two main components: first, it exploits conditions created as a result of the damage to Iran’s regional deterrence and the losses Hezbollah has suffered.
Second, this decision has been made within the framework of external pressures, particularly the conditions set by the United States for the continuation of its aid to Lebanon. It is clear that this demand stems more from U.S. and Israeli pressure than from the internal will of Lebanon. Meanwhile, due to the structural weakness of Lebanese society, governance, the state, and the army, it is fundamentally impossible to be confident that the army can fully defend the country’s borders and territorial sovereignty. It was Hezbollah and its weapons that, despite serious harm to its leadership, remained structurally stable and kept Israel behind Lebanon’s borders! Therefore, it seems that adopting such a decision is more a product of external conditions and pressures than rooted in political, social, or security needs and domestic realities.
These damages inflicted on Hezbollah have not significantly diminished its popularity or influence! A look at the latest municipal and village council elections in Lebanon, with all the sectarian characteristics of the country, the geographical distribution of these sects, and particularly the Shiites, confirms this claim.
Hence, from my perspective, the issue of disarming Hezbollah and the recent decision of the Lebanese government should be analyzed on three levels: national, regional, and international. The connection among these three dimensions clearly shows that Hezbollah’s weapons are not merely a political tool for gaining power but a geopolitical factor with transnational effects:
At the national level, this issue is directly linked to the balance of Lebanese forces and ensuring the security of society. In a country with a sectarian structure and a long civil war experience, the existence of an independent and national military force plays a decisive role in internal equations, and the mere desire or will of some Christians, who are materially and morally connected to Israel, does not justify disarming Hezbollah!
At the regional level, Hezbollah’s weapons have acted as a deterrent against Israeli aggression and played a key role in preventing Tel Aviv’s overreach, both militarily and in negotiations and political activities between Lebanon and Israel. Among Israel’s neighbors, Lebanon is considered the weakest and most vulnerable country, and Israel’s long arm and occupation have always extended over Lebanon, influencing Lebanon’s national equations and the balance of internal forces through its Christian ally in Lebanese internal affairs!
At the international level, this issue is tied to the policies and rivalries of major powers. The unconditional support of the U.S. for Israel, the positions of European powers, and even the stance of countries such as China, Russia, and European nations—especially France due to historical ties—all can influence the scope and consequences of the issue of disarming Hezbollah.
Regarding Hezbollah’s reaction to this resolution, so far it has been measured, appropriate, and national, based on a governmental perspective that considers public interests rather than partisan or sectarian ones. In my opinion, Hezbollah should be regarded as a growing and influential force at the national level in Lebanon, regionally, and even internationally, and resolving this issue should be left to them. There is no need for our officials to make a public stance on this matter, because this issue fundamentally concerns Hezbollah and is an internal and national decision, and this movement itself has repeatedly shown since 1982 that it has the ability to manage and resolve such challenges. If we accept this reality, many of the marginal issues between Iran and Lebanon can also be eliminated. Perhaps if, at this stage, there had not been insistence on the visit of our high-ranking officials, such as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, to Lebanon, the relations between the two countries might have retained their previous weight and stability, and regional actors such as Israel or Saudi Arabia would not have been able to influence these relations, which have abundant regional constructive capacities! Nor would there have been an opportunity for Iran’s regional opponents to further undermine Iranian-Lebanese relations! The Lebanese government normally understands very well that Hezbollah, its weapons, and Iran’s role are an effective and decisive factor in internal, regional, and international equations for this small and vulnerable country, and it sees no need to deprive itself of this factor.
In my opinion, if we believe in Hezbollah and accept that this movement can manage its affairs and, as they say, “get its rug out of the water,” we have not made a wrong choice. Although the recent resolution of the Lebanese government has an external origin, first it must be said that it is fundamentally unclear whether such a decision is implementable or not! From the beginning, Hezbollah has sought to manage the scene with a controlled and tension-managed approach. Initially, it tried through its representatives in the government to prevent the adoption of such a plan; however, external pressures, especially U.S. threats to cut economic, social, and even political assistance to Lebanon, which is vital for that country, forced the government to accept this path. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether such a decision can be practically implemented or whether it can bring long-term benefits to the Lebanese government in creating a balance against Israel. In recent days, as pressures intensified, the position of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General was also clear.
In my opinion, Hezbollah’s weapon is not merely a political factor; it is an element whose presence or absence can create significant geopolitical changes. Therefore, this issue cannot be resolved by force or military pressure, but only through negotiation and internal Lebanese political solutions, provided that the implementation of such a plan is even possible. So far, Hezbollah has tried to manage this issue internally and nationally, controlling tensions and preventing the country from sliding into civil war. However, it must be emphasized that if the Lebanese government seeks to pursue the implementation of this resolution, it will face a project that may not be reviewed in two or three months, nor even in one or two years, but rather in a long-term process. Nevertheless, I doubt Hezbollah will comply with such a demand because, as previously mentioned, this weapon is part of Hezbollah’s identity and existential philosophy, and attempting to disarm it could push the country toward civil war, instability, and even fragmentation.
Hezbollah is not the PKK, which disarms itself by the decision of its leader! Hezbollah’s weapon is an internal necessity of an important part of Lebanon’s political-social-military-security realities that has preserved the country’s independence! However, due to the complexities of the scene and the different and non-genuine motivations of domestic and foreign stakeholders, it is still impossible to predict a definitive and probable scenario for the future consequences of such a decision, as the issue is new and developments are still forming. If this matter is placed within the framework of a national discourse and resolved through political channels, a correct path lies ahead; but if this process fails and the matter escalates toward conflict and violence, a completely different path will emerge. Hezbollah insists on retaining its weapon for various reasons—sectarian, national, and regional. If the Lebanese government insists on implementing its recent resolution, this could lead to internal conflict and further consequences within Lebanon, pushing the country toward a new crisis. At the same time, it must be noted that Lebanese society is more complex than a simple line-drawing. In the balance among Shiites, Sunnis, and Christians, although some Christian or Druze groups, provoked by Israel, and some Sunni groups, provoked by Saudi Arabia, agree with Hezbollah’s disarmament, other segments of the same communities support Hezbollah’s weapon for various reasons. Thus, Lebanon faces a kind of diversity and even chaos in internal positions. How these positions will ultimately find a new balance is a matter that requires detailed examination and analysis in the future, but one thing should be certain for us in Iran: the necessity of trusting Hezbollah to resolve this internal issue through the levers at its disposal! In the worst-case scenario, according to the Iranian proverb, Hezbollah has fallen off the horse, not from its essence! God willing.
