SAESNEWS: Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi told an English-language media outlet that a new approach to cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is needed. He added that the agency has accepted this and plans to send a team to Iran to negotiate the details of this new method.
According to the political desk of Saed News, quoting Mashregh, Iran’s Foreign Minister made these remarks in an interview with the Financial Times on July 28.
The full transcript of the interview between Andrew England, Middle East editor of the Financial Times, and Araghchi is as follows:
Andrew England: Donald Trump said yesterday that if Iran resumes uranium enrichment, “we will immediately destroy it again.” What is your response?
Dr Araghchi: I think I responded last night. I’m sure you’ve seen my tweet. Our answer is clear. There is no military option against our peaceful nuclear program. If there are concerns, we can resolve them through negotiation. Just as we did in 2015—because of those same concerns—we negotiated and reached an agreement, and everyone was happy. All Europeans saw the agreement as a triumph of European diplomacy. The U.S. was also pleased and said all concerns had been addressed. The military attack on our nuclear facilities and this major breach of international law proved that there is no military option.
Andrew England: How much damage has been done to your nuclear facilities?
Dr Araghchi: They’ve been severely damaged. But we have the technology, and technology cannot be destroyed with bombs.
Andrew England: You’ve also said Iran will continue uranium enrichment?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, we will continue.
Andrew England: When will enrichment resume?
Dr Araghchi: I don’t know. That’s a matter for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.
Andrew England: But it’s also a political decision, isn’t it?
Dr Araghchi: There is the will. It is our right. It’s our only achievement. We’ve made major investments in this. We’ve paid a heavy price. We endured sanctions. We endured the assassination of our scientists. We fought for 12 days and lost over a thousand lives. So we cannot give up this right.
Andrew England: Within what timeframe could you resume your nuclear activities—within weeks or months?
Dr Araghchi: We reserve the right to resume our enrichment program. The timing and manner depend on the circumstances. But the United States must understand that technology cannot be destroyed by bombing. Through negotiation, we can reach an agreement that satisfies both parties. If the main U.S. concern is that Iran should never have nuclear weapons, that is achievable—because we are certain our program is peaceful, and we have no problem sharing that assurance with others.
Andrew England: Do you still possess the 408 kilograms of 60-percent enriched uranium?
Dr Araghchi: I don’t know.
Andrew England: Surely, you do.
Dr Araghchi: No, honestly I don’t—because they were in places that were bombed.
Andrew England: So they were there during the bombing?
Dr Araghchi: I don’t have precise information or figures, but I generally know they were in facilities that were bombed.
Andrew England: Isfahan, Natanz, and Fordow?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran is assessing the situation. It’s very difficult. Getting close to those damaged facilities is extremely difficult.
Andrew England: The assumption is that Iran moved the 408 kilograms prior to the attacks—especially from Fordow and Isfahan—and you told Grossi that you would take special measures to protect your facilities.
Dr Araghchi: No, I wrote to Grossi that due to threats against our nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, special measures must be taken. I didn’t say we had taken them or when we would. I said it is natural to consider special measures to protect our materials, scientists, and facilities. Then, suddenly during negotiations with the U.S., the Israelis decided to attack us. I am not the head of the Atomic Energy Organization.
Andrew England: But you’re the lead nuclear negotiator!
Dr Araghchi: Yes, but I’m not technically in charge of Iran’s nuclear program, and I don’t have precise information after the bombings. I know the damage to our nuclear facilities is severe, and I know our nuclear materials were in locations that were targeted.
Andrew England: Western intelligence also believes that part of the stockpile, not all of it, was preserved, and that the military strike did not destroy everything, and Iran retains enrichment capability.
Dr Araghchi: Perhaps not to the same extent as before. Although we lost many advanced centrifuges in Fordow and Natanz, we can still enrich uranium. We still retain enrichment capacity after the attacks.
Andrew England: You still have that capability?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, because we have both the theoretical and practical knowledge.
Andrew England: Do you still have the material and the technology—advanced centrifuges—for enrichment?
Dr Araghchi: Before the attacks, we had everything. The buildings can be rebuilt, and the machines replaced because the technology exists. We have many scientists and technicians who were working at our facilities, and as I said, we have the capability to do it. But the timing and method of resuming enrichment depends on the conditions.
Andrew England: Iran announced it would activate a new enrichment facility—apart from Fordow and Natanz—following the publication of the IAEA report and prior to the Israeli attack. Was it activated? Is it currently operational?
Dr Araghchi: As far as I know, preparations had been made for this, but it was not operational at the time of the attack.
Andrew England: Was that new facility also targeted? Since we don’t know its name, it’s very difficult for us to determine whether it was hit or not.
Dr Araghchi: As far as I know, yes.
Andrew England: Really?
Dr Araghchi: Yes.
Andrew England: Was it damaged?
Dr Araghchi: Yes.
Andrew England: Before it became operational?
Dr Araghchi: Yes.
Andrew England: Do you know its name? Can you share it with us?
Dr Araghchi: It is near Isfahan, and since it hadn’t yet become operational, I don’t know whether a name had been assigned to it.
Andrew England: Was it the Americans who bombed it, or not? Because we believed the Americans targeted storage facilities, not an enrichment facility in Isfahan.
Dr Araghchi: Why are you so interested in this matter? There is nothing to uncover. We possess the technical know-how and the technology, and whenever we decide, we have the capability to enrich. All options are available to us. These capabilities cannot be destroyed by military strikes. That is a fact. The recent attack on our facilities proved that the military option is not viable. That is exactly why you are asking me these questions now—because these capabilities are indestructible.
Let me return to my main point: our program is peaceful and will remain so. Although we were attacked and have the right to revise our doctrine, our nuclear doctrine is based on our own principles. Nuclear weapons are inhumane, and based on our Islamic teachings, these weapons are un-Islamic. As you know, we have a fatwa in this regard. But if there are concerns, there is a way to address them. Just as we negotiated last time, we can do so again—if there is genuine intent on the other side.
Andrew England: You’ve raised an interesting point. What are the conditions for resuming talks with the United States?
Dr Araghchi: The moment we are convinced that the other side has a serious and genuine intention to reach a win-win solution. If they intend to come and dictate what they failed to achieve through military means, that’s not negotiation. So, if we are persuaded that they are coming for a win-win solution, we will start negotiations tomorrow.
Andrew England: In light of the Israeli aggression, are there now new conditions for Iran to resume negotiations? And does that include Iran not agreeing to talks as long as the United States insists on zero enrichment?
Dr Araghchi: It is clear we would negotiate in order to convince them.
Andrew England: You would negotiate? Even if they still demand zero enrichment?
Dr Araghchi: We would negotiate to convince them that zero enrichment is not possible. As long as they insist on “zero enrichment,” there will be no agreement. That doesn’t mean no negotiations. We can negotiate—they can present their arguments, and we will present our perspectives and reasoning; we can have dialogue. But with “zero enrichment,” there will be no deal, though we do agree on “zero bombs.”
Andrew England: Are there now new conditions for resuming negotiations? Because you were already in negotiations—five rounds had taken place—and the sixth round had been scheduled two days before the attack. What conditions do you now have?
Dr Araghchi: If negotiations are to resume, they must explain why they attacked us in the midst of the previous negotiations, and we must be assured that it will not happen again. They must somehow compensate for the damage they have inflicted on us. So, clearly, any new negotiation cannot ignore the facts on the ground.
Andrew England: So are you saying that before being willing to resume talks with the U.S., you want a guarantee from the U.S. that neither it nor Israel will attack Iran or Iran’s nuclear facilities during the negotiations?
Dr Araghchi: They must convince us that no attack will happen.
Andrew England: You mentioned compensation—do you mean financial compensation?
Dr Araghchi: All forms of compensation. This is a matter for negotiation. Financial compensation for what has been imposed on us—and, of course, as you know, a significant number of our people were martyred in these attacks. So we cannot simply return to the negotiating table and pretend everything is normal. The circumstances are no longer the same as before. They have attacked us. Our facilities have been severely damaged. Therefore, we cannot enter into negotiations and act as though nothing has happened. That is self-evident. So this time, negotiations will be much more difficult, and they must understand that by attacking our nuclear facilities, they have not made the path of negotiation easier—they have made it more complex and more difficult.
Andrew England: In the op-ed you wrote for the Financial Times—for which we’re very grateful—you talked about confidence-building measures. You’re calling for confidence-building measures. Can you give an example? What could the U.S. do to build trust?
Dr Araghchi: We’ve had two very bad experiences. In 2018, the United States unilaterally withdrew from an agreement that took two and a half years to negotiate. They reimposed sanctions without any justification, despite multiple IAEA reports confirming Iran’s full compliance with its nuclear commitments. Today, the situation is even more difficult, as our facilities have now come under attack. If talks are to resume, we will require actions from the United States that ensure they will not resort to military measures again and will remain committed if a deal is reached. I don’t believe they can give us a 100% guarantee, but they must take steps to build trust. This is extremely difficult. There’s a huge wall of mistrust between us. I don’t think we can easily remove it. Even opening a window in that thick wall is not easy.
Andrew England: Have you been in contact with Steve Witkoff since the war?
Dr Araghchi: I haven’t spoken with him, but during and after the war we exchanged messages, and I think we both concluded that keeping the communication channel open is useful.
Andrew England: What has he told you?
Dr Araghchi: About what?
Andrew England: Since the war began, has he suggested resuming talks in Muscat or anywhere else?
Dr Araghchi: I believe there’s a willingness on their part to resume negotiations. But as I said, the situation is not what it was before. We cannot restart negotiations as if nothing has happened.
Andrew England: Has Witkoff made any proposal to resume negotiations?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, both directly and indirectly.
Andrew England: When?
Dr Araghchi: During and after the war. It’s no secret. They’ve raised this on several occasions. But the right conditions need to exist for talks to resume.
Andrew England: What’s your message to Witkoff?
Dr Araghchi: There’s no need to deliver a message through this platform—I can do it directly.
Andrew England: I mean generally—what would you say when he calls?
Dr Araghchi: My message is not complicated. The recent aggression proved that there’s no military solution to Iran’s nuclear programme. Issues can only be resolved through negotiation. To achieve a negotiated solution, we must begin a win-win process to reach a win-win outcome. Negotiation is a give-and-take process. If they are ready, so are we.
Andrew England: Give and take? In other words, both sides must make concessions. So, is Iran willing to agree to a temporary suspension of enrichment—not to give up its right to enrichment, but as a confidence-building measure towards the United States?
Dr Araghchi: Don’t expect me to negotiate here. I will leave these questions for the negotiating table.
Andrew England: Considering that Israel's attack on Iran occurred during negotiations, without provocation, the cost Iran has incurred for its nuclear programme, the fact that Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018 after Iran had made concessions, and the fact that you were once again negotiating with the Americans when the attacks happened—do you face internal pressure within the system, from the ruling elite and centres of power, saying: "Let’s not negotiate. We warned you last time not to trust the Americans, look what happened. Let’s abandon talks and push enrichment toward a nuclear weapon"? Is there such pressure?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, there is an understanding that we should not negotiate anymore, but there is no willingness to pursue weaponisation. Such discussions exist in society, in universities, the media, even in parliament. But our policy has not changed. In the government and across the entire system, we remain committed to our fatwa and principles. Therefore, we are not seeking nuclear weapons.
Andrew England: Is there pressure from those in power not to negotiate?
Dr Araghchi: There is pressure from almost everyone not to negotiate. Anti-American sentiment, even anti-negotiation sentiment, is very strong. People tell me not to waste our time or theirs anymore. Don’t be deceived again. If they are willing to negotiate, it’s only a cover for their other objectives. So I really have a hard task convincing everyone that negotiation can be fruitful.
Andrew England: Do you have the support of Iran’s Supreme Leader?
Dr Araghchi: Negotiations in 2015 were fruitful, but the U.S. backed out. This time, we were negotiating when they chose the military option. So convincing both the public and officials is difficult.
Andrew England: Does this mean there is only a narrow window to resume negotiations? Is there a limited time to return to talks before a return to conflict?
Dr Araghchi: I think, as you said, the path of negotiation is narrow, but not impossible. I must convince my superiors that if we go to the table, the other side will come with genuine intent for a win-win deal. For that to happen, I believe the other side—the American side—must convince us that it will.
Andrew England: Has Witkoff tried to convince you?
Dr Araghchi: He has tried. So have intermediaries. But I think we need real confidence-building measures alongside their efforts.
Andrew England: And is that confidence-building measure compensation, or an agreement on compensation?
Dr Araghchi: That’s part of it. You know, emotions in Iran are still intense. People are still mourning their martyrs. If you walk through cities, you’ll still see the names and pictures of our martyrs everywhere. Ceremonies are still ongoing, like the one we had this morning at the Supreme Leader’s office. So going back to negotiations is not easy. But as a diplomat, I will try. First, I have to convince myself. Then I must convince others that if we return to negotiations, there will be no military operation in the midst of talks. Secondly, the other side must come for a win-win solution. They must not come to dictate terms. They must not come to the table in pursuit of objectives they failed to achieve militarily. It is impossible if they expect me to come to the table and sign off on what they couldn’t obtain through force.
Andrew England: Regarding the talks with the three European countries in Istanbul, the Europeans said: “If Iran agrees to resume cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and negotiations, we might extend the snapback mechanism deadline for more than three or six months.” Is that accurate, and if so, what is your response?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, such a proposal was made, but we do not believe they have any legal or moral basis to invoke the snapback mechanism. They are not in a position to use it within the JCPOA framework. Therefore, it is evident that they cannot extend it.
Andrew England: But a UN Security Council resolution could extend it?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, but we do not believe the three European countries can still be considered JCPOA participants. Since they have not honoured their commitments under the JCPOA—and given that some of them have supported the U.S.-proposed zero enrichment policy—they can no longer be considered parties to the deal. The JCPOA recognises Iran’s right to enrichment and explicitly accepts Iran’s enrichment at 3.67%. If they do not accept that, if they believe zero enrichment is a better option, then they are no longer part of the JCPOA. Therefore, they cannot invoke the dispute resolution mechanism under the JCPOA. That is our position, and we have informed them that we do not believe they have any legal standing to do so. I have sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council, outlining our arguments as to why we believe they lack the legal right to take such action.
Andrew England: But they still can.
Dr Araghchi: What happens if the snapback mechanism is triggered?
Andrew England: That strongly depends on Iran’s response.
Dr Araghchi: No—assume we do nothing.
Andrew England: If you do nothing, then it becomes a symbolic act.
Dr Araghchi: If the previous resolutions come back, the current resolution is nullified. What difference does it make?
Andrew England: Given the extent of U.S. sanctions on Iran, it’s a symbolic act. It would lead to the return of UN sanctions—international sanctions—against Iran.
Dr Araghchi: My question is this: We have Resolution 2231, which expires on 18 October 2025. On that date, the snapback mechanism would be activated, and previous resolutions would return—particularly Resolution 1929. My question is: what difference does it make? Did the current Security Council resolution protect us from military operations? No. Did it protect us from U.S. sanctions? No. So what’s the point? The Europeans believe this gives them leverage, but that’s not the case.
Andrew England: Is that what you told them?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, we have told them. We’ve said that the snapback mechanism is no longer that important.
Andrew England: But Iranian officials have warned that if the snapback mechanism is implemented, Iran might withdraw from the NPT.
Dr Araghchi: We will definitely respond. What will our response be? I don’t know. But there will be a reaction. The question, however, is that if they trigger the snapback mechanism, it’s no longer very significant—because we have now concluded that the Security Council cannot protect us from aggression or illegal sanctions. So let them have whatever resolution they want. If the Europeans trigger the snapback mechanism, they will have excluded themselves from any further involvement in nuclear negotiations with Iran. We will no longer speak to them.
Andrew England: Will you expel their ambassadors?
Dr Araghchi: No, but we will no longer negotiate with them on nuclear matters.
Andrew England: If they trigger the snapback mechanism?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, if they do that. Why should we continue negotiations with them? There is only one reason to negotiate with the Europeans—and that is the snapback mechanism. Because they can’t lift or suspend sanctions. They can’t prevent aggression. They can’t do anything. The only leverage they believe they have is the potential activation of the snapback mechanism. If they go ahead with it, it’s over. They will play no further role in the future of Iran’s nuclear negotiations.
Andrew England: But as long as the snapback mechanism isn’t triggered, you will continue negotiating with them?
Dr Araghchi: Diplomacy never ends.
Andrew England: Will there be another round of talks with the Europeans?
Dr Araghchi: We will continue negotiations with any party we believe can engage in useful talks that serve the national interest. That depends on our assessment. But regarding the Europeans, the question constantly arises: what is the point of negotiating with them? As I said, they cannot lift sanctions, they can’t do anything. The only leverage they believe they have is the possibility of activating the snapback mechanism—and if they do that, it means the end of the road for them. They will have no role in the future of Iran’s nuclear negotiations.
Andrew England: Right now, in a way, both the Trump administration and Tehran have sidelined the Europeans. Everyone knows that if a deal is reached, it will be a bilateral agreement between the United States and Iran. But don’t you feel the Europeans are now more important in terms of helping convince Trump and working through the technical details to reach an agreement?
Dr Araghchi: They want to make sure that Iran’s nuclear program, including enrichment, is peaceful. We can take confidence-building steps in exchange for lifting sanctions. So I think we can easily reach an agreement with the U.S. on this, as long as they acknowledge that Iran has the right to enrichment, and that uranium will in fact be enriched as an exercise of that right. That’s what I told Mr. Witkoff during the negotiations.
Andrew England: But in your article, you said you were close to a breakthrough. How could you have succeeded on that issue? I mean, was there a formula?
Dr Araghchi: I think, at the time, there were solutions to reach a middle-ground agreement.
Andrew England: Do you mean a consortium?
Dr Araghchi: I don’t want to go into details. A consortium was one idea. There were other ideas too that could have brought us to a compromise and a middle path.
Andrew England: Like 1% enrichment or something similar?
Dr Araghchi: By “middle path,” I don’t mean 1 or 2 percent. You know, enrichment below 5% is for peaceful purposes—everyone knows that. Four or 4.5%, or whatever. In the JCPOA, we agreed on 3.67% for various reasons. But below 5% is for peaceful use. Then there is 20% enrichment, which we need for our research reactor—Tehran Research Reactor—and you know who built and supplied that reactor.
Andrew England: The Americans during the time of the previous Shah. During the Pahlavi era.
Dr Araghchi: Yes, before the revolution, they built the Tehran Research Reactor, which operated with 90% enriched uranium. Did you know that?
Andrew England: No.
Dr Araghchi: It was a research reactor built by the Americans for us, and they provided us with 90% enriched uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor. After the revolution, we did it ourselves—we reduced the enrichment from 90% to 20%, reconfigured the reactor, and it worked. Today, this reactor produces radioisotope medicines needed by more than one million Iranians, and this must continue.
Andrew England: Is that why you need 20% enrichment?
Dr Araghchi: Yes, this is a clear need for Iran. How can they say that Iran doesn't need enrichment?! We do need enrichment. Twenty percent enrichment is necessary for the Tehran Research Reactor, which supplies medicine for over one million Iranians. Also, regarding enrichment below 5%, we need it for our nuclear reactors, which are under construction and in the design phase. We are also working on that technology.
Andrew England: Would you consider a regional consortium? Is that still an option? We believe it is the right path.
Dr Araghchi: I can tell you right now that a regional consortium is a good idea, but it cannot replace our own enrichment.
Andrew England: So if it’s based in Iran, you would accept it?
Dr Araghchi: There are many technical, legal, and financial aspects regarding a potential consortium in Iran that we have not yet addressed. Of course, this idea was raised in the negotiations before the attack. But then everything stopped and it remained as it was. I’m not sure now whether this idea would still work or not, but if necessary, we are ready to negotiate it.
Andrew England: But it has to be on Iranian soil?
Dr Araghchi: Of course.
Andrew England: Iran suspended cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, then announced its willingness to discuss a new approach or a new normal during a visit by a technical team. What is required to resume cooperation with the IAEA in a way that allows them to inspect all sites as before?
Dr Araghchi: Obviously, the situation on the ground has changed. So we need a new approach to cooperation with the Agency, and they have accepted that and are supposed to send a team to Iran to negotiate this approach. This method will define how we cooperate in the future. Of course, this framework will be based on a law passed by our own Parliament, which assigns the responsibility of cooperation with the Agency to Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. So everything must pass through that council. And the reason is clear—there are security concerns about cooperating with the Agency, and those concerns must be taken into account.
Andrew England: Are those security concerns related to information leaks or the safety of individuals?
Dr Araghchi: Concerning everything. Their own safety, our safety, the security of our materials—for example, the safety of our facilities—everything. A military attack was carried out on a registered nuclear facility.
Andrew England: Some say this is all the more reason for IAEA inspectors to come and conduct a thorough assessment of the damage, any radiation, and all related matters concerning nuclear safety and non-proliferation.
Dr. Araghchi: No, we do not believe there is such a need. We had been cooperating very well with the Agency before. But the result of that cooperation was an attack on our nuclear facilities. Now, before resuming cooperation with the Agency, we must take all safety and security measures into account. So let’s wait until an agreement is reached regarding the framework of cooperation between Iran and the Agency.
Andrew England: When will that discussion take place? Do you know when they will travel to Iran?
Dr. Araghchi: I think mid-August, maybe after their holidays.
Andrew England: Regarding China, President Trump said Iran could export oil to China. Since then, have you been able to export more oil to China? Or do you think this is a kind of flexible policy on Trump’s part?
Dr. Araghchi: Our oil exports have been under sanctions for a long time, but we have done it and continue to do so.
Andrew England: But depending on how strict the sanctions are, exports fluctuate.
Dr. Araghchi: Yes, of course. We are quite expert at living with sanctions.
Andrew England: Thank you very much. As a final question, has the war ended or has the first phase concluded?
Dr. Araghchi: The aggression has stopped, and correspondingly, our right to self-defense has stopped. That’s it. There is no ceasefire agreement, nothing else. They stopped the aggression unconditionally, and we also stopped defending ourselves. When there is no aggression, naturally, there is no reason for self-defense. Since they requested the cessation of attacks without any conditions, we accepted.
Andrew England: Do you think it could resume? I mean, are you worried? People here seem concerned.
Dr. Araghchi: Everything could resume. They could resume, we could resume. There is no official ceasefire, and anything is possible. And it’s not only Iran that should be worried.
Andrew England: Thank you very much for your time, and we wish you success in the negotiations.
Dr. Araghchi: You’re welcome. Thank you.
