SAEDNEWS: In an editorial, Kayhan criticized Dr. Pezeshkian’s recent remarks, writing that his statements have 'spread a wave of despair and hopelessness' in society and sent a message of weakness to Iran’s enemies. Kayhan questioned whether these comments were the result of a mistake or misguided advice from his advisors.
According to the political section of Saed News, Kayhan newspaper wrote:
For some time now, Dr. Parviz Pezeshkian, our respected president—whose integrity and dedication to the nation and the system are beyond question—has been making remarks in speeches and official statements that, regardless of their accuracy, have two effects. On one hand, they inject a wave of despair and pessimism into society. On the other, they give vocal enemies of the Islamic Republic a platform to criticize and signal weakness and vulnerability.
Statements like “We are hungry!” or “Right now, we face problems in every sector—water, electricity, gas, budgets, and inflation. There is no area without problems!” and, as recently as yesterday, “If it doesn’t rain in Tehran by December, water will be rationed; if it still doesn’t rain, we will have to evacuate Tehran!” illustrate this pattern.
Given our understanding of the president, it is clear that such statements stem from genuine concern for the revolution, the system, and the people. Yet evidence and repeated assessments from committed experts suggest a significant gap between these statements and reality. This raises the question: whose advice informs these discouraging remarks? Are the advisors making mistakes, or, God forbid, do they have ulterior motives? Dr. Pezeshkian has consistently emphasized the necessity of “national unity.” Would consulting top experts with differing opinions not be a clear example of such unity? The answer is undoubtedly yes.
Before citing a historical example for insight, it is important to note that “cognitive warfare” is one of the newest arenas of soft power conflict. As James Giordano describes, cognitive warfare seeks to shape the opponent’s thinking exactly as the enemy desires. The cautionary story we recount here is not meant to suggest, God forbid, that some advisors are disloyal; rather, it highlights the potential for unconscious alignment with adversaries’ objectives.
Marshal Tito, the president of Marxist Yugoslavia, recounted in his memoirs that Soviet intelligence (KGB) once informed him that a CIA spy was embedded in his cabinet. Despite carefully reviewing his ministers’ communications, Tito could not locate the spy. Eventually, with KGB guidance, he confronted one deputy. After a cabinet meeting, Tito asked him directly, placing a gun to his temple: “Are you a CIA spy?” The deputy, realizing his cover was blown, admitted: “Yes.” Tito asked how long he had been spying. The man replied: “Since my student days.” When asked why no trace of communication with the CIA had been discovered despite strict security checks, he explained: “I had no direct contact. I was assigned tasks that did not require it, and I carried them out faithfully.” Tito then asked the nature of his mission. The deputy answered: “I was instructed to act in personnel appointments without regard for expertise or alignment. My duty was to destabilize from within, and I fulfilled it.” He added: “CIA analysis suggested that by this method, Tito’s revolution in Yugoslavia could be undermined internally without a coup or foreign attack.”
It goes without saying that, God forbid, we are not drawing a direct parallel between that historical incident and the current government. Circumstances, tactics, and conditions have changed dramatically over the decades. Yet the lesson remains relevant: if advisors’ perspectives inadvertently align with an adversary’s agenda—even without ill intent—they may unconsciously transmit the enemy’s viewpoint, believing they are serving the nation. This is the essence of cognitive warfare.
