Why Achieving a ‘Major Trump-Iran Deal’ Is Difficult: Two Likely Scenarios for Tehran-Washington Relations

According to the political service of Saed News, “Israel’s twelve-day war with Iran in June and the recent ceasefire between Israel and Hamas have raised new questions about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Tehran.”

The Atlantic Council, in an analytical report, claimed in its introduction that the Gaza ceasefire demonstrated how, when the U.S. president personally intervenes and leverages all available tools of pressure and negotiation, what once seemed impossible can become possible. Israel, the Palestinians, the United States, and the region still face significant work to prevent the conflict from reigniting. Trump and his team could capitalize on the momentum of the Gaza ceasefire and focus on a broader regional agreement that includes Iran, as Trump noted in his recent speech at the Knesset.

The report outlines two general paths: one is a negotiated agreement offering a long-term solution, and the other is a fragile ceasefire punctuated by occasional clashes. Both scenarios carry unique risks and opportunities.

Scenario One: “The Big, Beautiful Deal”

The “big, beautiful deal” Trump refers to would likely require the U.S. to provide Iran a pathway to sanctions relief and regional economic opportunities while simultaneously protecting Iran from potential Israeli attacks. Although many obstacles stand in the way, such a deal could offer substantial benefits to all parties.

Experts like Vali Nasr suggest that such an agreement could even reshape domestic politics in Iran, potentially making it more appealing to Iranian officials.

The U.S. would need to rebuild Tehran’s trust, conduct negotiations carefully, and offer two key guarantees: first, that it would not withdraw from the deal unless certain conditions occur, and second, that a mechanism would exist to prevent further Israeli attacks on Iran. In return, Iran would likely need to commit to a much lower level of enrichment (for example, 3.6 percent) and accept strict International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. While Iran is unlikely to halt domestic enrichment entirely, it could initiate a joint project abroad—perhaps in Oman with Gulf investment—and import enriched material for nuclear power production. Iran had previously proposed a similar project domestically before the war.

The author argues that Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA stemmed from unmet non-nuclear issues, suggesting that in a new agreement, Iran might be compelled to negotiate on ballistic missile programs and support for regional groups. (Tehran has consistently stated that talks with the U.S. will be limited to the nuclear domain and that its defensive capabilities are non-negotiable.)

For this scenario to succeed, Tehran must perceive this agreement as more favorable than alternatives. Iran has invested billions in its nuclear program, viewing it as both a deterrent and a source of national pride. The June war reignited waves of nationalism.

The report emphasizes that post-October 7 developments have weakened Iran’s regional influence, leaving its nuclear program as Tehran’s primary bargaining card. This also complicates negotiations for Iranian negotiators.

To win Israeli support, the U.S. would likely need to offer reasonable pressure and incentives, such as improved defense contracts and mediation of a ceasefire with the Houthis to halt attacks on Israel and its affiliated vessels.

Despite potential benefits, the complexity and entrenched obstacles make this scenario extremely challenging. Israel could resume military action at any moment, derailing talks. If the Gaza ceasefire holds, Israel may reassess its security priorities, including concerns regarding Iran.

Scenario Two: Fragile, Stable Ceasefire

In this scenario, U.S. national security concerns over Iran’s nuclear program persist, and the risk of renewed war between Israel and Iran remains. Negotiations may occur or stall, but substantial progress toward a comprehensive deal is unlikely.

The author notes that current trends suggest a move in this direction. Iran’s foreign minister recently stated that the U.S. and Iran exchange messages through intermediaries and that Iran will “certainly” consider any “reasonable, balanced, and fair” proposal. However, Iran is unwilling to abandon its “right to uranium enrichment,” a position the U.S. currently rejects, insisting that Iran must relinquish this right in any agreement.

Risks of a Fragile Stability

The report warns that Israel could again conduct direct military action in Iran in the coming months or years. Israel has set red lines, claiming it would consider military options if Iran crosses them. These include denying adequate inspections to the IAEA, resuming enrichment, and supporting groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. (Iran has consistently stated that these groups operate independently despite friendly relations with Tehran.)

The author highlights the potential for U.S. involvement if Israel strikes Iran again. Should Iran retaliate, Israel might face shortages in missile defense systems, particularly against long-range ballistic missiles, a vulnerability exposed in the recent conflict.

Further military operations in Iran could strain Israel’s army, economy, and domestic politics. Historically, Israel’s strategy focused on short, intense wars to preserve limited forces and avoid prolonged conflict. However, multiple reserve units have already been deployed to Gaza, affecting their civilian roles.

An April 2025 report indicates that over 100,000 Israeli reservists no longer respond to service calls, and training attendance has fallen to 60 percent—a significant drop since the Hamas attacks in October 2022. Repeated conflict with Iran could impose high economic and social costs on Israel.

Unresolved disputes and the stop-and-start nature of clashes could harm U.S. and global commercial interests in the region. Repeated wars—or the fear of them—could impact U.S. trade, technology partnerships with Gulf countries, shipping freedom, and energy prices.

Arab states are concerned for their security and interests. As seen during the June war and Iran’s strike on the U.S. Al Udeid base in Qatar, Gulf countries could become targets. They also worry about critical oil routes, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, which could face disruption.

The author concludes that a comprehensive agreement represents the best outcome for all sides. Achieving it will be difficult due to the need for precise focus, severe mistrust, and hardline positions. If the current trajectory continues, the situation may settle into a fragile equilibrium with intermittent clashes—heightening the risk of a broader conflict with severe consequences.

The Atlantic Council ends on a hopeful note, suggesting that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner could leverage their experience negotiating with Hamas to craft a mutually beneficial solution for reaching an agreement with Tehran.