An Agreement Between Iran And The United States Is Possible Under One Condition.

The current negotiations are the result of both sides’ knowledge, experience, and reassessment of the JCPOA. Despite its flaws, the JCPOA provided a framework for resolving issues. Had Iran and the international community had more experience at the time, they might have achieved a better agreement. Nevertheless, Iran’s perspective toward the JCPOA is not intended to be repeated in these talks. In the JCPOA, Iran negotiated with six countries, whereas now it faces only one — a situation with its own strengths and weaknesses. China, Russia, and Europe are absent from these negotiations, but it is logical that China and Russia should not feel sidelined.

It should also be noted that European countries, due to their absence, have taken a destructive approach to the talks, although Italy has tried to benefit from this situation and hosted the second round of negotiations.

Interaction of Internal and External Hardliners

Another point is the observed interaction — deliberate or not — between internal and external hardliners in trying to sabotage the negotiations. Inside Iran, there are claims that Iran has compromised its positions, while abroad there are voices arguing that no negotiations should occur with Iran. Overall, the rhetoric on both sides seems to serve each other.

English-speaking lobbies of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) and Israeli lobbies have also become active, labeling any agreement with Iran as a disaster. They claim Iran is merely buying time to pursue nuclear weapons and pose a global threat. These lobbies try to depict Iran as weak and accuse it of deceiving the U.S. to continue its activities.

Inside Iran, similar remarks are sometimes heard, describing these negotiations as merely temporary — exactly mirroring the stance of the MKO and Israeli lobbies.

Arab Shift Compared to the JCPOA Era

Tafreshi further said: Regarding the Arab world, about 15 years ago, during a Chatham House event organized by the U.S. embassy’s media department, a question was asked of then Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal about Iran-Saudi and Iran-U.S. relations. His classic and important answer was that U.S.-Saudi relations are strategic and unbreakable, while Iran is a dear brother and neighbor — and one cannot choose neighbors. Thus, Saudi Arabia considered it a duty to maintain good relations with Iran.

However, during the JCPOA period, Saud al-Faisal took a different stance, actively opposing the agreement. This anti-Iran policy continued under Mohammed bin Salman. Over the past decade, neither King Salman and his son nor Iran achieved complete dominance in the region. The prudence seen in Saudi Arabia today toward Iran contrasts sharply with the JCPOA era. Although Saudi Arabia might have welcomed curbing Iran's nuclear program, it feared Iran’s recognition by the six world powers.

Tafreshi noted that, currently, the situation appears different: Iran and Saudi Arabia will likely never become strategic allies, but neither can ignore or eliminate the other. Thus, both have no choice but to cooperate — the same strategy initiated during Rafsanjani’s era and formalized in a security pact under Khatami. If not for the rise of Ahmadinejad in Iran and the leadership changes in Saudi Arabia, the two countries might have reached a stronger strategic-security relationship.

Tafreshi concluded: With the developments following October 7 and the shifting regional dynamics, it is crucial to maintain and protect Iran’s relations with Arab countries to avoid further disruptions. Preserving such ties advances the general framework of any agreement, although technical-security and military discussions — such as uranium enrichment levels and storage sites — still require careful negotiation and control, sometimes beyond the direct influence of politicians.

In general, Iran and the U.S. could reach an agreement, provided that internal and external elements do not succeed in undermining it. It does not seem that either side intends to cancel the process altogether, but it is very possible that Israeli and domestic hardliners will attempt to derail it by any means, regardless of the consequences.