SAEDNEWS: During Iran’s 12-day war with Israel, Russia made no contradictory declarations that conflicted with the essence of its strategic ties with Tehran. However, in the military sphere, it failed to deliver the kind of support that Iran expected. This gap between expectation and reality stems from various factors.
According to the political desk of Saed News, Farhikhtegan wrote: During Iran’s 12-day defense war, Russia officially condemned the Zionist and American aggression against Iran. On the nuclear issue — the next front of Western pressure — Moscow reaffirmed its support for Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear enrichment.
Yet within Iran, the prevailing interpretation was that Russia did not move beyond diplomatic posturing. Unlike Iran’s substantial backing of Russia during the Ukraine war, Moscow responded to Iran’s own hour of need with caution and hesitation. After the war ended, Iranian Foreign Ministry officials explicitly voiced these grievances. However, to better understand this complex bilateral dynamic, several key points must be considered:
Russia is under immense pressure from Europe and the U.S. due to its ongoing war in Ukraine — and thus avoids widening the scope of its conflicts wherever possible.
Russia’s muted support may reflect a misreading of the Iran-Israel war — viewing it as a limited regional skirmish, rather than a strategic confrontation with broader implications.
Iran must reassess some of its arrangements with Russia — recognizing that in international relations, it is mutual interests — not sentiment — that sustain cooperation. Russia is no exception.
While Russia's behavior during the war drew legitimate criticism, Iranian responses to it have ranged from extreme pessimism to excessive optimism. Some voices went so far as to suggest abandoning Russia as a strategic ally — driven by their hopes to improve ties with the West. Others exaggerated limited Russian actions during the war, overlooking shortcomings. Instead of such extremes, Russia’s actions must be judged on the basis of current international realities.
From the start, Moscow’s stance was clear: it called for an end to hostilities, identified Israel as the aggressor, and condemned its attacks. However, this position was not expressed with the clarity or force Tehran expected. Russia's support appeared too soft and slow. Yet, after Deputy FM Araghchi’s visit to Moscow — carrying a direct message from Iran’s Supreme Leader — Russian rhetoric sharpened. At the UN and Security Council, Russian representatives eventually condemned the aggression more decisively. So while their policy was consistent, it gradually evolved into a clearer, firmer position.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia holds potential influence. It may not be able to generate pro-Iran resolutions, but it can certainly veto anti-Iran ones. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, however, Moscow has faced deep skepticism from the West — a dynamic only worsened by the Ukraine war. This severely limits its capacity for Western consensus-building. Still, Russia has supported Iran in other platforms like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Following the war, Iranian officials hinted at a possible recalibration of ties with some countries — Russia included. Tehran’s expectations were clearly not met in Moscow’s initial response. While ties between the two nations are unlikely to suffer a major rupture, Iran may seek new partners in some sectors, particularly defense — reducing overreliance on Russia.
The wisest course is to maintain normal cooperation while diversifying sensitive partnerships. This includes seeking new allies in critical areas like military technology. Such a strategy avoids ruptures while enhancing strategic resilience.
The main point of Iranian frustration lies in Russia’s analytical failure. While Iran framed the Ukraine war as a broad conflict between Russia and NATO — and acted accordingly — Moscow treated the Israeli assault as a bilateral Israel-Iran clash. This reductionist view ignored the reality: NATO’s military, intelligence, and logistical infrastructure was backing Tel Aviv. A defeat for Iran would have consequences for Russia and China too.
In the worldview of Western political strategists, Iran, Russia, and China form the triangle of anti-Western resistance. Recent events have led the West to view Iran as the triangle’s weakest link — ripe for destabilization. A blow to Tehran, in this view, could pave the way for targeting Moscow and Beijing next.
Thus, if Russia and China fail to appreciate the full strategic scope of this war — if they treat it as a regional skirmish rather than a front in a global standoff — they are making a critical error. To act wisely, they must recognize that this confrontation belongs in the same category as Ukraine and Taiwan: a major test of resolve against the West’s expanding agenda. If that understanding prevails, a strategic recalibration in Moscow and Beijing’s support for Tehran may yet emerge.
