SAEDNEWS: Amid rising tensions between Iran and the West following the activation of the trigger mechanism, the Atlantic Council predicts that Tehran’s cooperation with Moscow will deepen further, accelerating Iran’s strategic pivot to the East and strengthening the anti-Western axis with Russia and China.
According to the political news service of Saed News, tensions between Iran and Western countries have sharply increased following the re-imposition of pre-2015 UN sanctions on Tehran in September, triggered by the action of three European nations—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—in activating the “snapback” mechanism under the nuclear deal (JCPOA).
However, the Atlantic Council think tank concludes that Iran is likely to deepen its cooperation with Russia, which views the re-imposition of these sanctions as illegal. This development is expected to accelerate Iran’s strategic pivot toward the East—a trend that has gained momentum since the first Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018.
The think tank notes that both Iran and Russia are highly pragmatic actors. As long as the West continues policies of isolating Iran, expanding economic cooperation between Tehran and Moscow is a logical outcome. Both countries, sharing a common goal of countering U.S. influence, are prepared to extend their bilateral and multilateral collaborations.
Initially, Moscow viewed the snapback mechanism as a practical solution to avoid a diplomatic deadlock. Today, however, Russia opposes its activation. After the three European countries initiated the snapback process on August 28, Moscow described the move as legally “flawed,” arguing that the Europeans had forfeited their right to trigger the mechanism by violating the JCPOA themselves. Russia also emphasized that the re-imposition of pre-2015 UN sanctions carries no binding international legal obligation, despite European claims to the contrary.
When the Trump administration attempted a unilateral snapback in 2020, Russia and China jointly opposed it, arguing that the U.S. exit from the JCPOA undermined the legal legitimacy of such a move. To support this claim, Moscow and Beijing referenced the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion in June 1971 on South Africa’s presence in Namibia, which stated that a party abandoning its obligations under a treaty cannot simultaneously claim rights under the same treaty.
Moscow, having declared that it would not recognize the re-imposed sanctions, attempted to delay and weaken Europe’s activation of the mechanism. Nevertheless, a draft resolution presented by Russia and China to maintain Iran’s sanctions relief was rejected in the UN Security Council on September 26: nine countries, including the U.S., U.K., and France, voted against it; four countries (Russia, China, Algeria, and Pakistan) supported it; and two abstained.
Dmitry Polyanskiy, Russia’s deputy representative to the UN, said at the Security Council: “We hoped our European and American colleagues would reconsider and choose diplomacy and dialogue over clumsy coercion—a path that only escalates regional tensions.”
Although Russia could not prevent the re-imposition of UN sanctions, it can still hinder enforcement by obstructing the reactivation of the “1737 Sanctions Committee,” which oversees Iran sanctions, or delaying the appointment of its experts. Since the committee requires Security Council consensus, Russia can use its veto power to block actions.
The Atlantic Council argues that Russia’s opposition to snapback is not merely symbolic but a strategic effort to mitigate the impact of sanctions. Iran-Russia ties are expected to deepen under sanctions, with Russia’s refusal to enforce new UN sanctions helping Iran reduce economic pressure. Bilateral trade and cooperation in areas such as nuclear energy are likely to expand, as both countries continue implementing the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” signed nine months ago in Moscow by Vladimir Putin and Masoud Pezeshkian. Meanwhile, Russia will defend Iran’s interests in the Security Council and criticize Western policies toward Tehran more sharply.
The alignment of Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran against snapback activation and new sanctions has reinforced Iranian officials’ belief that joining non-Western institutions like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was a smart strategic decision. Within its “look East” doctrine, Tehran sees its geopolitical fate intertwined with Russia, China, and other non-Western powers, including Pakistan, Central Asian republics, and even North Korea.
From Tehran’s perspective, the actions of the three European countries are further evidence of long-standing mistrust toward Western powers—a mistrust that makes nuclear concessions appear futile. European support, particularly from Germany, for Israel during its strikes on Iran and U.S. military attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities has strengthened this view and weakened the position of pro-dialogue factions in Tehran.
Overall, the growing closeness between Iran and Russia undermines Western efforts to isolate Tehran. By expanding economic, military, and diplomatic coordination, both countries aim not only to neutralize the effects of Western sanctions but also to challenge the U.S.-led global order. The prospects of reviving the JCPOA or reaching a new nuclear deal appear bleak, and the West’s inability to engage effectively with Iran on nuclear, missile, and regional policies is likely to accelerate Tehran’s alignment with Moscow.
