SAEDNEWS: Regarding criticism of his performance, the Foreign Minister says: “We have used the full set of powers available to us and carried out planning. Pre-war negotiations were designed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and we were able to proceed within the specified framework.”
Nearly a year has passed since Seyed Abbas Araghchi assumed the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the fourteenth government. During the past more than three hundred days, Iran and the West Asia region have experienced a series of unprecedented developments. It can be said that the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the late head of Hamas’ political bureau in Tehran, at a time when Araghchi’s presence in the Foreign Ministry had not even been officially formalized by a parliamentary vote of confidence, was a sign of a turbulent year ahead — a year that continued with the direct aggression of the Zionist regime against Iran, in coordination, consultation, and complicity with the United States.
The U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities was practically a direct blow to the indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States hosted by the Sultanate of Oman. Today, although we are witnessing the cessation of military aggression against Iran, the suspended negotiations between Iran and the United States have not resumed, and Iran’s relations with Europe are also experiencing tense days under the shadow of the European troika’s threat to activate the mechanism for the automatic reinstatement of U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran.
According to IRNA, on the eve of Government Week and one year after the start of the fourteenth government, in the program “Diplomacy Desk”, IRNA hosted Seyed Abbas Araghchi and asked him about the latest status of negotiations to lift sanctions, the debates surrounding his one-year performance, and, of course, some important regional files including the war in Gaza, relations with Syria and Lebanon, and the outcome of ties with the Taliban authority in Afghanistan. (Read the first part of IRNA’s interview with the Foreign Minister about the President’s ongoing trip to Armenia here.)
One year after the start of the fourteenth government, this administration has gone through more than 300 days full of events and incidents. The foreign policy approach of the fourteenth government was more or less clear, but recently, President Pezeshkian, in explaining the reason behind the government’s support for negotiations to resolve disputes, made remarks that have faced sharp reactions. As the Foreign Minister of this cabinet, how would you describe the government’s foreign policy approach, especially after the war?
The approach of the fourteenth government is a clear one. We have sought to increase diplomatic engagement, especially in the region and with our neighbors. We have never refrained from diplomatic engagement with Western countries, including the United States, nor from negotiating with the U.S. on the nuclear issue. We planned in this regard and even took steps. Everyone witnessed that we held five rounds of negotiations which ultimately led to war. In other words, our approach has been to use negotiations and the tools of diplomacy in foreign relations, and strengthening this approach has been our focus.
Let me repeat here a sentence I have said many times before, to avoid any misunderstanding: Both negotiation and war are tools that governments choose to achieve their objectives. Negotiation and diplomacy are less costly and less risky paths, but sometimes their cost is even greater than war. War is usually costly, but in some cases, it may be less costly than a negotiation that results in surrender. Therefore, neither of these two tools has intrinsic sanctity, nor do they have inherent evil. Everything depends on which tool you use under what conditions.
Both negotiation and war are tools that governments choose to achieve their objectives. Negotiation and diplomacy are less costly and less risky paths, but sometimes their cost is even greater than war. War is usually costly, but in some cases, it may be less costly than a negotiation that results in surrender. In some situations, you must fight; if you do not fight, you have, so to speak, lost, and you have ignored the country’s interests. In some conditions, you must not fight, because in that case, you would impose an unnecessary cost on the country. In some cases, one must negotiate and resolve the country’s problems through negotiation. And sometimes, one must not negotiate — especially when negotiation may lead to surrender, humiliation, or the questioning of a country’s dignity. This applies when the sovereignty of the country is threatened and the other side seeks to achieve through negotiation what it could not achieve through war.
These are issues that must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The fourteenth government is fully committed to the principle that Iran’s national interests and the supreme interests of the Iranian people determine what must be done at any given time. Just as we stood firm, strong, and powerful in the war, fought, resisted, and witnessed its results, if necessary, we will also stand firm in negotiations with the same strength and determination and strive to safeguard the country’s interests. Just as we resisted in war, we have resisted in negotiations as well. When the other side became disappointed in imposing demands against Iran’s interests and security through negotiations, it turned to its next tool.
"We entered negotiations, but we did not compromise on the interests of the Iranian people or the rights of the nation. This is our principle. Dr. Pezeshkian has also always emphasized this point. Of course, his style is unique to him, and the people voted for him with that style. A style that, in my opinion, stems from his sincerity and connection with the people. He speaks in his own language, and we in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs speak in our own diplomatic language. But the essence of the matter and our principle in foreign policy is to use the tools of diplomacy wherever necessary and not to miss the opportunities that diplomacy creates. One should not have a black-and-white view of negotiation or war; thinking that war is always sacred and negotiation is always wicked and should be avoided is an incorrect and unrealistic perspective.
Decision-making in foreign policy is a sovereign matter, not just a governmental one.
Can we talk about a good and acceptable alignment between the expert opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government’s decision-making in foreign policy over this past year?
Certainly. But when we talk about decision-making in foreign policy, another matter also arises. When it comes to approaches, tactics, and executive conduct, the government acts directly. But decision-making in foreign policy is a sovereign matter, not merely a governmental one. It is the entire governing system that decides, and the government at large—that is, generally—and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in particular, implement the policies decided at the sovereign level.
When it comes to approaches, tactics, and executive conduct, the government acts directly. But decision-making in foreign policy is a sovereign matter, not merely a governmental one. This is entirely obvious and works the same way in all countries. It is the same in Iran, and it has been repeatedly discussed and emphasized. The Supreme Leader has also explicitly stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—not only in Iran but in all countries—is the executor of decisions taken at the sovereign level.
Of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government play their roles in the process of policy-making and decision-making, express their opinions, and present their views. But ultimately, once a decision is made, everyone must comply with it, whether they voted for it or not. After that, the decision becomes collective, and everyone must follow it.
In this regard, both the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have always been implementers of the system’s decisions, which are made at the highest level. Ultimately, the sovereign authority is the Supreme National Security Council; this council has its own procedure for decision-making, and once a decision is made, everyone must follow it. Reason also dictates that when a decision is made collectively, everyone must implement it. No one can say that because they opposed the decision, they will not implement it. If they do not want to implement it, they can resign and step aside. But as long as they hold a position, they must execute the system’s high-level decisions.
In the 12-day war, our diplomacy limited the scope of the war compared to the enemy’s plan.
In recent months, you have been constantly defending negotiations that were conducted indirectly, while also presenting arguments about why these negotiations were beneficial. Part of society asks: today, after that twelve-day war, when you look back, do you think there was a way to prevent the military aggression of the Zionist regime through diplomacy?
That is exactly what we were doing. Over the past year—or, as you say, in the past 300 days—we faced a wartime environment. Perhaps before this 12-day war, we came close to war at least three other times. Now, to what extent society noticed this is a separate matter. I think the people understood the situation. At those times, diplomacy became active and played its role.
Could you please explain a bit about what the diplomatic apparatus really did during those three periods? Because I have not seen any reference to it so far. Was it our regional diplomacy that played a major role?
Our regional diplomacy was very effective. I remember that in a short period, I traveled to almost all the countries in the region, and a collective understanding emerged that war benefits no one, and if war spreads in the region, it could cause disastrous losses for all countries. This is precisely what the Zionist regime wants—that no country in the region be strong. They want the region to be weak, fragmented, and collapsed. We must not allow the Zionist regime to achieve this goal and spread the fire of war in the region.
It is not only diplomacy that can prevent war. It is the collective power of a country that creates deterrence. Diplomacy is, in fact, the language of a country’s power, not the power itself. Power is created when successful diplomacy converts the components of a country’s strength into security and interests. This, in my opinion, was the understanding established in the region, and the contacts and lobbying by regional countries, along with our own follow-up, at various stages advanced, delayed, and limited the war. Even in the 12-day war, in my view, our diplomacy succeeded in limiting the scope of the war more than it could have been. This was because of the work of diplomacy."
But I must mention one more point; you see, it is not only diplomacy that can prevent war. It is the combination of a country's powers that creates deterrence. Diplomacy is, in fact, the language of a country's power, not the power itself. Power is created when successful diplomacy can convert a country's power components into security and interests.
Therefore, when we examine the reasons for the occurrence or non-occurrence of war, we must consider the full set of a country's power components. Even in those instances when war did not occur, and our policies were active and moved in the region, I do not attribute all of it solely to diplomacy, but rather to the capability of our armed forces to respond strongly, which prevented the war. In the war itself, it was this capability that led to the end of the war. Of course, diplomacy was effective, but it was truly the powerful response capability of the Islamic Republic that caused the enemy to despair of continuing the war.
All the enemy's efforts in the early days of the war were aimed at destroying this capability; they martyred commanders or struck specific centers to reduce our response capacity, but they did not succeed. Because they did not succeed, after 12 days they realized that the blows inflicted were unbearable for them, and therefore it was they who requested a ceasefire. Thus, diplomacy has its place and role, but essentially, it is the continuation of a country's combined powers that leads to transformation.
Was this demand from the United States raised in the first and second sessions, or was it raised in the third and fourth sessions? Some believe that this demand was not present in the first and second sessions and was suddenly raised in the third session as a maximalist demand.
No, the United States’ demand from the beginning was that Iran should not have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Some convinced them that, even with enrichment, this capability would always exist, and therefore their demand effectively became “zero enrichment.” From the first day and the first round of negotiations, this was their demand. Of course, during the negotiations, we sometimes tried to show them that achieving the goal of no nuclear weapons does not necessarily conflict with the existence of enrichment. Our policy is definite; according to our fatwa, principles, and beliefs, we do not want nuclear weapons but want to retain enrichment — both for our own needs, as a right that must be exercised, and as a valuable scientific achievement we have reached ourselves. Sometimes, certain proposals could have been effective, but when these proposals reached Washington, their decision changed again. It was clear that a stronger lobby in Washington was influencing them.
Before the war, we put several operational plans on the negotiating table with the United States.
So the Iranian negotiating team had operational plans on the table? Some believe that perhaps Iran’s negotiation design was not correct.
Yes, we had several operational plans to create a compromise between enrichment and not possessing weapons. These plans were considered during the negotiations, and there was shown willingness, but when they reached Washington, there were people who convinced them that they must insist on “zero enrichment.” I think there was a much stronger lobby in Washington that imposed this demand on the Americans. Otherwise, the Americans, or at least our negotiators, were ready to reach shortcut formulas.
In the scope of the Foreign Minister’s duties, I have full authority.
Mr. Minister, you have critics on both sides of the field and diplomacy; some people believe you were politically optimistic, both during the five rounds of negotiations and in some other positions, and there is a group that believes you have become overly cautious. Especially, some statements from prominent individuals with whom you have prior collaboration have emerged in the past month, saying that more powers should be granted to the Foreign Minister. Tell the people clearly: Are your hands tied?
I have already responded to this issue; decisions of the system are made beyond the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs implements these decisions. In executing these decisions, we have discretion, and at the time of decision-making, we can also present our opinions and analyses, which is fully possible. But once a decision is made, the implementer can no longer say, "I want discretion to act however I wish." This is incompatible with any rule; neither reason and logic, nor governance principles, nor organizational order allow such a thing. It is like deciding on an operation in the army, and then a soldier in the middle of the war says he does not accept this operation and will act however he wishes.
In executing the system's decisions, we have discretion, and at the time of decision-making, we can also present our opinions and analyses, which is fully possible. I believe that within the duties and powers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, we have had and still have full authority. We are currently also actively involved in decision-making, and in fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ analyses have been influential, and our opinions have been taken into consideration.
I have not become conservative; I operate within the framework determined by the governance.
Has your ministry made you conservative? This question also applies to many criticisms directed at you. You yourself have probably noticed that it is also mentioned in cyberspace that Mr. Araqchi, the Deputy Foreign Minister and head of the negotiating team during the JCPOA period, has become more conservative during his ministry?
What is the difference between a deputy minister and the minister? Whether you are a deputy minister or a minister, you operate within a framework. Those friends who make such a claim have themselves experienced similar situations and know that the Foreign Minister specifically, and the government in general, cannot follow any path in foreign policy that it personally determines. Paths and decisions are made within the broader governance structure, beyond the government, and we are obliged to act within that framework.
Do you agree that what differentiates foreign ministers is the execution? That is, you cannot attribute everything to decision-making and policy formation. After all, we have had different foreign ministers, and what distinguished their performance was partly this kind of execution. I want you to answer here whether you are conservative in execution. That is, do you refrain from using some of the authorities you have?
No, that is not the case. We have utilized the total authorities we had and have carried out planning. Negotiations before the war were designed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and we were able to proceed within the defined framework. This framework does not allow you to take any position you want in negotiations because the objective of the negotiation is clear, and you cannot act outside that objective. This cannot be called "caution"; it is a duty.
Decision-making regarding negotiations takes place in the Supreme National Security Council.
Is the design of negotiations after the war still within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
Yes, of course, as always, from the first day negotiations started, decision-making takes place in the Supreme National Security Council, and execution is by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In execution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs designs with whom, how, and where negotiations will take place and what the negotiation strategy is; from where to start and where to reach. In this regard, someone may or may not criticize us; our strengths and weaknesses lie in this execution. But what the overall policy should be, the limits within which it can move, where it should not advance or retreat, all of this is decided in the Supreme National Security Council.
Weren’t we negotiating when the war broke out?
In one of your recent interviews, you mentioned that public opinion should not be kept in a state of doubt, indecision, tension, and constant anxiety about the resumption of war. Before the JCPOA in 2015 and afterward, if we spoke about the impact of foreign policy on people's lives, it was limited to the effect of sanctions on livelihoods. But today, being here, we are talking about diplomacy’s impact on the possible restart of war or keeping its shadow away from people’s lives. Surely, in conversations ordinary people have with you, they raise this concern and question: will there be war again? In any case, the public’s concerns cannot easily be eliminated with words. With the cessation of the war, it seems that one of the public’s expectations is the resumption of negotiations with the same specifications that were previously discussed. However, it seems that during this time, we have been caught in a deadlock. Why do we not get out of this negotiation deadlock? What are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ initiatives in this regard?
Where I referred to indecision, which causes, so to speak, its own damage to the country, it was in a discussion about the psychological war that has arisen alongside the real war. The real war has now stopped, but the psychological war has not, and they are trying to impose the same demands they had from the real war psychologically on society. Therefore, through various interpretations, analyses, and actions, they keep this feeling alive in society that today there will be war, tomorrow there will be war. What I meant then and still mean is that we should not get caught in the psychological space the enemy tries to create for us. We have a real war, a media war, a psychological war, and a political war; in all of these, we must exercise caution.
In a recent interview, I said—of course, I might be wrong—but my feeling is that an unusual anxiety, agitation, and uncertainty is being injected into our society more than it should, and we must not allow this injection to happen. This does not mean that we should not be cautious to prevent a war; it does not mean that we should not take necessary precautions. But it does mean that we should not fall to the other extreme.
Didn’t we negotiate and then war happened? So negotiation does not necessarily prevent war. We must be prepared from every direction. What prevents war is readiness for war. If your enemies sense that you are not ready to fight, they will impose war on you.
The next point is that in the discussion I had regarding the sanctity of war and negotiations, I should have added—and I add it now—that some people in diplomacy and war fall off one side of the spectrum; that is, they always consider negotiation good and a solution to everything, and they always consider war bad. I repeat: where you must fight, you must fight, and where you must not fight, you must not fight. Negotiation is the same.
Now, the idea that since there is a possibility of war, we must go negotiate—my answer is: didn’t we negotiate and then war happened? So negotiation does not necessarily prevent war. We must be prepared from all sides. What prevents war is readiness for war. If your enemies feel that you are not ready to fight, they will impose war on you. Readiness for war should also not lead to anxiety about war or agitation about war. Managing this is a highly skillful task that, in any case, all responsible authorities in the country—political, economic, psychological, and media—must pay attention to. We must neither allow society to fall into agitation and anxiety nor become unrealistically optimistic or naive.
We currently have a plan for negotiation, but we must understand that this does not mean that negotiation can prevent war. Only a month or two has passed since our very recent experience.
As for the negotiations we are designing or have designed, one of them is with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We made first contact with the agency after the so-called war. Mr. Aparo, the Deputy Director General of the agency, made a visit. We told the agency that, in any case, new conditions have emerged; our facilities were bombed, and there is no precedent for how to deal with bombed facilities. On the other hand, the parliament’s law has obligations that restrict us in some cases, and the process has been authorized through the Supreme National Security Council. Therefore, we must first sit together to reach a framework, modality, or new cooperation structure and start cooperation based on that.
We cannot completely cut off cooperation with the agency.
Was there any progress during this visit?
Mr. Aparo’s visit, in order for us to reach a better understanding on this issue, was good in my opinion. After this visit, we documented and presented our set of views regarding a possible modality based on parliament’s law. On Saturday, August 16 (25 Mordad in Iranian calendar), the agency documented its views and returned them to us. This back-and-forth interaction between us and the agency continues. Colleagues will probably be sent to Vienna for another round of negotiations there.
Will the return of inspectors be within this framework according to parliament’s law?
The return of inspectors will be possible based on parliament’s law, meaning with the approval of the Supreme National Security Council. I want to give an example to make this clear to everyone. We cannot completely cut off cooperation with the agency. For example, in about a month or a month and a half, it will be time to refuel the Bushehr power plant, and this refueling must take place in the presence of agency inspectors. Therefore, inspectors must be present so we can carry out this work. Even the Russian officials at the power plant tell us to expedite this work so that we can do it, otherwise according to the rules, we cannot perform this task. This is one of the issues that must be specified in the modality.
Mr. Aparo’s visit, in order for us to reach a better understanding on this issue, was good in my opinion. After this visit, we documented and presented our set of views regarding a possible modality based on parliament’s law. On Saturday, August 16 (25 Mordad), the agency documented its views and returned them to us.
Another point is that, in principle, the agency presents its request to inspect facilities that were not bombed; we send this request to the Supreme National Security Council, and the council decides under what conditions inspection will be allowed. This must be done, and we must plan for it. So it is not that we say we absolutely cut off cooperation with the agency. If one day the system decides to withdraw from the NPT, it will do so. Meanwhile, we currently plan to stay in the NPT. I give this as an example, and it should not be imagined that this debate currently exists or does not; rather, we may reach a point in the future where this discussion arises.
In response to some behaviors?
Yes, we have not yet reached that point. Cutting cooperation with the agency is one of the consequences of leaving the NPT; one cannot be in the NPT and not do this. That is, one would pay the cost of withdrawal without actually leaving.
New cooperation with the Agency will definitely not be like before
At this stage, will not cooperating with the Agency now further contribute to the “securitization” of Iran’s file?
This is both true and has certain considerations. Cutting off cooperation with the Agency has its own specific consequences, and continuing cooperation with the Agency in the previous manner is no longer possible. My question to the Agency is: for inspecting a bombed nuclear facility, what specific protocol exists? The Agency itself has no answer, because such a precedent has never existed. A facility registered with the Agency that was engaged in peaceful nuclear activities has been targeted by bombing; now the question is, how should its inspection be conducted? The Agency has no prior experience in this regard and cannot provide a specific protocol; for example, to say that in this case one should refer to a particular paragraph of the safeguards law. Therefore, negotiation is required, and in some ways, this is not easily achievable.
Given recent experience, without a doubt, new security and safety considerations have arisen for us. Under current conditions, even approaching these facilities may involve particular risks. Therefore, until these matters are clarified, resuming cooperation is not possible. This new cooperation with the Agency will definitely not be like before, especially since, according to parliamentary law, all matters must be pursued through the Supreme National Security Council, and it is this council that decides where and how inspections are conducted, or whether they are conducted at all.
We do not consider the European Troika as a JCPOA member
Regarding the design of negotiations after the Agency issue, what are the next steps you mentioned?
We are also in contact with the Europeans.
Have these contacts become like “negotiations for the sake of negotiations”? That is, multiple meetings are held, but it does not seem that any particular success has been achieved.
The term “negotiation for the sake of negotiation” can have two meanings: once meaning negotiation merely for the act of negotiating, for example to respond to public opinion or to waste time, which is usually how this expression is used. But the second meaning is that negotiation is conducted in order to determine the method of negotiation.
Are we now negotiating to determine the method of negotiation?
At present, with the Europeans, we are at the stage of examining whether there is fundamentally a basis for a real negotiation and serious exchange between us and them.
Do you think the Europeans view these negotiations as you indicated?
No, they are even more interested in this matter than we are. In meetings we had with European parties, their emphasis was also on this issue, that we must see on what basis we can enter negotiations. In one of the meetings, I asked them to provide a reason why we should negotiate with you. Which sanctions or threats can you lift or resolve?
Is the “snapback” issue not one of our reasons?
Yes, currently the only tool they think they have is this snapback. Regarding this, we have also clearly explained our position to them: first, you do not have the right to use snapback, because after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and with your recent positions—including the “zero enrichment” proposal—you have effectively left the JCPOA yourselves. Therefore, you are no longer recognized as a participant in the JCPOA, and snapback rights are exclusive to the remaining JCPOA members.
Second, even if we assume that you have the right to use snapback, what would happen if it were implemented? First, Europe’s role in the diplomatic process would completely end; you would have used a tool, and it would be finished. Then what remains? The end of diplomacy?
Return to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the potential re-imposition of arms sanctions, are important matters, and we must not allow such a process to take place. Efforts are being made in this regard. However, Europe must know that if it takes such action, it will not put us in a difficult position. I asked them this question explicitly. When they said there is little time left for diplomacy, I asked, do you mean that after using snapback, diplomacy ends? They had no answer. It is clear that diplomacy does not end, but Europe will no longer play a role in it. Europe has drawn its sword and lowered it. Now if that happens, what would occur? For example, the return of previous Security Council resolutions. Yes, I also agree that we must not allow such a thing to happen, because it is undesirable. But this return no longer has the same importance and impact as before.
Resolution 1929 was very dangerous, but now Resolution 2231 is being implemented, which is a more favorable resolution. However, has 2231 prevented war from occurring? Or stopped sanctions? No. The reality is that the Security Council and its resolutions no longer have the same effectiveness as before, neither for them nor for us.
Of course, I emphasize again that these developments have consequences and should not be underestimated. For example, return to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, or the potential re-imposition of arms sanctions, are important matters, and we must not allow such a process to take place. Efforts are being made in this regard. However, Europe must know that if it takes such action, it will not put us in a difficult position.
A new session with Europe is being planned
Have we reached a negotiation basis with Europe yet?
Not yet, we have not reached such a basis. Of course, it is possible that in the coming days a meeting on this subject will take place. The Europeans themselves have realized that using the snapback mechanism at the moment brings no benefit either for them or for others.
And they suggested extending Resolution 2231.
Yes. Well, when we believe that they do not have the right to implement the "snapback," it is natural that they do not have the right to extend it either. Our position is that they are not in any position or capacity to make decisions regarding the snapback, whether about implementing it or extending it.
Could Iran agree to an extension under specific conditions? To prevent the return of Security Council resolutions, in your words? Have you thought that perhaps one solution could be for Iran to also put its conditions on the table?
(laughing) Are you giving negotiation guidance now?
No. But the probability of snapback activation is high, and then people may ask why the Foreign Minister said Europe has no right, but we see that it happened. Like the JCPOA, when it was said that the chance of the U.S. leaving was very low, but in the end, it did.
Look, when I say Europe has no right, I mean that legally, politically, and ethically, it does not have such a right.
But adherence to any of these practically does not exist.
Yes, snapback may eventually be activated, I do not deny that. For several years now, we have been working with China and Russia on this issue. We have had multiple joint meetings and have designed a set of actions jointly that we will implement if snapback is activated. Regarding what solution exists to ultimately prevent snapback, discussions have taken place among the three countries, and some measures are also under consideration; although we may not succeed.
Snapback may eventually be activated, I do not deny that. For several years now, we have been working with China and Russia on this issue. We have had multiple joint meetings and have designed a set of actions jointly that we will implement if snapback is activated. The first point is that they do not have the right to take this action, but that does not mean I should come and say, “You have this right.” Our position is clear: they do not have such a right.
The second point is that if snapback occurs, it will cause political and strategic damage for us, but it is not the end of diplomacy or the end of everything.
The third point, which I think should respond to a common misconception in society, is that the activation of snapback will not be more economically impactful than the current situation.
Will it affect our oil sales?
No. Its economic impact will not exceed the current situation. No sanctions more than what currently exist will be imposed. Because I observe that many people, or even some officials, think that if snapback is activated, sanctions will return. My question is: which sanctions? The Security Council economic sanctions are far more limited compared to the current unilateral U.S. sanctions.
The consequences of snapback are indeed serious and heavy, but...
But currently, some countries cooperate with us economically because the sanctions are unilateral and say they do not recognize them. If these sanctions fall under the Security Council, do you not think even some of our friendly Eastern countries would become anxious in interacting with us?
No, this is exactly my point. The effect of snapback is more psychological than real. We had this discussion; it was said that some countries might say they will no longer buy oil due to snapback activation. Our response is that Security Council resolutions had no connection to our oil, banks, or many other sanction areas. That is why the U.S. moved towards unilateral sanctions. But why does this affect the psychological atmosphere? Because internally, this situation may intensify uncertainty, and externally, some governments may feel the conditions have worsened. This psychological atmosphere must be countered.
I have raised this issue in several places, and some accuse me of downplaying snapback consequences; while this is not true. Snapback consequences are indeed serious and heavy and must be prevented. However, at the same time, they should not be exaggerated. We should not think that with the activation of snapback, harsher or new economic sanctions will be imposed that we cannot withstand. This is not the case. The situation will not worsen beyond the current state. Yes, there are psychological, political, and even strategic consequences, but not to the extent that it paralyzes diplomacy or the country.
The U.S. cannot take from me at the negotiating table what it could not take in war
How close are we to resuming negotiations with the U.S.?
Negotiation with the U.S. must happen in its own time. Every negotiation has a specific timing, which we call “negotiation maturity,” and it must reach that maturity to take place. In my view, we have not yet reached that point of maturity for an effective negotiation with the U.S. In my view, the Americans have also not reached a point to engage in an equal negotiation. Even if they seek negotiation, they want to take at the negotiating table what they could not achieve on the military field, which they will not succeed in. I will not enter this negotiation to ignore the rights of the Iranian nation, which they bombed but could not eliminate. They have not created a reassuring point that Iran will never enrich again, because they could not secure our signature at the negotiating table promising that we will not do it. This is not a negotiation.
Receiving compensation from the U.S. is a negotiation topic, not a precondition
Does the Islamic Republic of Iran have a precondition to start negotiation? Some recent interviews interpreted that you have preconditions, such as the payment of compensation. Are these preconditions or negotiation topics?
These are negotiation topics. My interview with the Financial Times had a wrong headline. In that interview, I said that if negotiations begin, one of our topics would be compensation and damages, but I did not say it was a precondition. It cannot be a precondition, because compensation and damages themselves require negotiation. You cannot sit at home and expect them to hand over damages; you must negotiate to receive compensation. Its scope has highs and lows, and they may not accept it at all. It must be discussed. Therefore, it is not a precondition, but it will be one of the negotiation topics.
Contradictory Messages from the U.S. via Intermediaries
How about from the other side? Have intermediaries told you, for example, that the Americans have specific demands and that if you accept them, you can come to the negotiation table?
Let me state a fact: we receive contradictory messages via intermediaries. There are also contradictory messages in interviews and statements by the American side. One of our problems, both during previous negotiations and now, is that we have not heard a coherent statement from the Americans. The statements keep changing, and the messages that come are contradictory. Sometimes the messages differ from each other, and sometimes they differ from the interviews. I think perhaps there is no final summary yet on the American side, and perhaps they are caught up in other issues.
Possibility of Changing the Host of the Negotiations
Media speculation has suggested that the intermediary or the host of Iran-U.S. negotiations may change. Do you confirm this?
In diplomacy, everything is always possible.
So the two sides are moving toward choosing another host?
The choice of host must be based on the agreement of both parties. No one can impose that a particular intermediary must be used. Intermediaries can also play different roles; some are stronger in one area and weaker in another. Whether new negotiations will still be through Oman or a new intermediary will be chosen, there is no final conclusion yet.
Still Far from Recognizing the Afghan Ruling Authority
We are on the verge of the fourth anniversary of the fall of the republic in Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban. How close do you think the Islamic Republic of Iran is to recognizing the current caretaker government? Are the preconditions we previously mentioned—such as forming an inclusive government—still on the table?
We are still distant from recognition, but the reality is that we have close cooperation with the Taliban and the current government, for a very clear reason: the national interests of the Iranian people. Iran shares approximately 1,000 kilometers of border with Afghanistan and faces multiple challenges, from refugee issues to narcotics, border security, terrorism in Afghanistan, water issues, trade between the two countries, the Persian language, and the security of the people, especially the security of Shiites. In other words, we have about eight to ten major and important challenges and cannot ignore them. Addressing these issues requires dialogue with the current Afghan government, and there are talks and negotiations. Therefore, diplomacy between us is ongoing. I myself have made a trip to Kabul, and more trips have been made and will be made by my colleagues. Various ministries also send their officials there. The topics I mentioned, in addition to many other issues, are always on our agenda. However, we have not yet reached the point of formal recognition.
Has the ruling authority moved closer to the points Iran considers necessary for this relationship to take a more official form, or do you think the Taliban are still distant?
In the challenges I mentioned, we have made good progress in some and not in others. For example, our border security has been better in the past four years than before. It is a fact that the Taliban government in Afghanistan has maintained security well; I’m not saying 100%, but it is good. Regarding the Shiites, their security has been maintained, but their rights have not been fully respected in recent years. Concerning water, the situation has improved but is still not at the expected level. Trade is ongoing well, but the banking issue there has not been resolved. Regarding refugees, cooperation has taken place with their return, and the Afghan side has cooperated. They had three requests from us, which I think were reasonable: first, that the return should not be massive, which is reasonable to allow them to absorb it; second, that it should be done honorably, which is a reasonable point and we also observe it here; third, that when returning their properties, for example, if they have claims, these should be respected. Many had rented homes here and need to reclaim their deposits. Well, landlords cannot immediately provide the money and need time to collect it. Therefore, their claims should be respected, and our Ministry of Interior is attentive to this matter and now pays more attention than before. Thus, there is now an understanding between us and them; around one million have returned, and no crisis has occurred either there or here. In summary, we have challenges; in some of these we have progressed well, in others, problems remain. Some are in an intermediate state, and I think the level of neighborhood cooperation is currently acceptable.
Contradictory Messages from the United States through Intermediaries
What about the other side? Have you been informed through intermediaries, for example, that the Americans have specific demands and that if you accept them, you can sit at the negotiating table?
Allow me to point out a fact: we are receiving contradictory messages through intermediaries. There are also contradictory messages in interviews and statements from the American side. One of our problems, whether in previous negotiations or now, is that we have not heard a coherent statement from the Americans. Statements are constantly changing, and the messages that arrive are contradictory. Sometimes the messages differ from one another, and sometimes they differ from the interviews. I think perhaps there is no final summary yet on the American side, and perhaps they are preoccupied with other issues.
Possibility of Changing the Host of the Negotiations
There has been media speculation that the intermediary or host of the Iran-U.S. negotiations may change. Can you confirm this?
In diplomacy, everything is always possible.
Does this mean that both sides are moving toward choosing another host?
The choice of host should be based on the agreement of both parties. No one can impose that this intermediary must be chosen necessarily. Intermediaries can also perform different roles; some are stronger in a certain field and weaker in another. Whether the new negotiations will take place through Oman or a new intermediary will be selected, no final conclusion has been reached yet.
We Are Still Far from Recognizing the Ruling Authority in Afghanistan
We are approaching the fourth anniversary of the fall of the Republic in Afghanistan and the return of the Taliban. How close is the Islamic Republic of Iran to recognizing the current interim government? And are the preconditions we mentioned previously, such as forming an inclusive government, still on the table?
We are still far from recognition, but the fact is that we have close cooperation with the Taliban and the current government, for a very clear reason: the national interests of the Iranian people. Iran shares about 1,000 kilometers of border with Afghanistan and faces multiple challenges, from refugee issues to drugs, border security, terrorism in Afghanistan, water problems, trade between the two countries, the Persian language, and the security of people, especially the security of Shias. In other words, we have about eight to ten major and important challenges that we cannot ignore. Addressing these issues requires dialogue with the current Afghan government, and there are ongoing talks and negotiations. Therefore, diplomacy between us is ongoing. I personally visited Kabul, my colleagues made other visits, and the visits will continue. Various ministries also send their officials there. The topics I mentioned, in addition to many other issues, are always on our agenda. However, we have not yet reached the point of official recognition.
Has the ruling authority approached the points that Iran considers necessary to make this relationship more formal, or do you think the Taliban are still far away?
In the challenges I mentioned, we have made good progress in some and not in others. For example, our border security has been better during the past four years compared to before. It is a fact that the Taliban government in Afghanistan has maintained security well; I am not saying 100%, but it is good. For the Shias, their security has been maintained, but their rights have not been fully respected in recent years. Regarding water, the situation has improved but is still below expectations. Trade is going well, but the banking issue there has not been resolved. Concerning refugees, there has been cooperation regarding their return, and the Afghan side has provided cooperation. They had three requests from us, which I believe are reasonable: first, that the return not be collective, which makes sense to allow them to be absorbed; second, that it be conducted in a dignified manner, which is a reasonable point and we comply with it here; third, that when their property is returned, such as if they have dues, they must be respected. Many of them rented homes here, and their deposits must be returned. Well, the owners cannot pay the money immediately and need time to gather it. Therefore, their dues must be respected, and our Ministry of Interior pays attention to this matter, and now they are more attentive than before. Thus, there is now an understanding between us and them; about a million have returned, and no crisis occurred there or here. In short, we have challenges; in some we have made good progress, and in others, we still face problems. Some are in an intermediate state, and I think the level of neighborly cooperation is currently acceptable.
