SAEDNEWS: An American analyst, Giorgio Cafiero, characterized Iran’s approach as ‘strategic patience, national dignity, and resistance to external pressure,’ remaining open to diplomacy while refusing to negotiate under coercion.
An American academic and political analyst has emphasized that Iran’s current foreign policy reflects a posture of strategic patience, national dignity, and firm resistance to external pressure.
In an exclusive interview with IRNA on Wednesday, Giorgio Cafiero, CEO of Gulf State Analytics, Adjunct Assistant Professor at Georgetown University, and Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project, said, “Tehran has made it unequivocally clear that it will not be coerced or intimidated into negotiations under duress. The message is that diplomacy must be grounded in mutual respect and sovereign equality—not in pressure or threats.”
He noted that Iran’s continued engagement in key diplomatic forums, including meetings with the European E3 and the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, shows its commitment to dialogue and multilateralism.
“The Iranian Foreign Minister’s overland travel to Turkey, even amid external aggression, symbolized both resolve and resourcefulness, and sent a clear message that Iran remains engaged with regional and international actors even under the most challenging circumstances,” he noted.
Cafiero said, “In sum, the Islamic Republic has effectively conveyed that while it remains open to diplomacy, it will not do so from a position of vulnerability. Iran’s approach is defined by strategic patience, national dignity, and resistance to external pressure.”
Below are the main highlights from the interview:
Q: In your view, what are the distinctive features of the current Iranian administration’s foreign policy?
A: The current Iranian administration’s foreign policy appears to be shaped by two overarching objectives. First, it is focused on enhancing deterrence against threats from the American-Israeli alliance with the clear aim of preventing any future military aggression or bombing campaigns against Iranian territory. This involves not only military preparedness but also strategic signaling intended to raise the cost of such actions for potential adversaries.
Second, the administration in Tehran is prioritizing economic resilience in the face of continued Western sanctions. This includes efforts to deepen regional and international partnerships—especially with non-Western powers, chiefly China—while simultaneously strengthening domestic industries to reduce reliance on external actors.
Together, these efforts reflect a broader strategic vision: to protect Iran’s sovereignty and stability while navigating a complex international environment shaped by ongoing geopolitical tensions and intense economic pressure.
Q: How do you assess the performance of Iran’s diplomatic apparatus during the 12-day war imposed by Israel and the United States, considering Iran was under attack amid ongoing negotiations, the Foreign Minister traveled overland to Turkey during that period, and Iran took part in meetings such as with the European E3 and the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation?
A: During the 12-day conflict, Iran’s diplomatic apparatus demonstrated a carefully calibrated balance between resilience and engagement. On one hand, Tehran made it unequivocally clear that it would not be coerced or intimidated into negotiations under duress, signaling that diplomacy must be conducted on the basis of mutual respect and sovereign equality, as opposed to pressure or threat.
At the same time, Iran’s continued participation in key diplomatic engagements—including meetings with the European E3 and the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation—underscored its enduring commitment to dialogue and multilateralism.
The Foreign Minister’s overland travel to Turkey, even amid external aggression, symbolized both resolve and resourcefulness, and sent a clear message that Iran remains engaged with regional and international actors even under the most challenging circumstances.
In sum, the Islamic Republic successfully conveyed that while Tehran remains open to diplomacy, it will not do so from a posture of vulnerability. Rather, Iran’s current approach is one of strategic patience, national dignity, and resistance to external pressure.
Q: How would you evaluate the current U.S. administration’s foreign policy—particularly toward Iran—following the 12‑day war, and what do you believe would be the likely approach of a possible Trump administration, considering Iran’s stated commitment to negotiation, advancing diplomacy to resolve international disputes, adherence to international law, and respect for the territorial integrity of all countries?
A: There are some contradictions to the Trump administration’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Iran following the end of the 12-day war in June. On one hand, it seems that Trump has lost quite a bit of interest in the topic of Iran and its nuclear program since the U.S. military struck three Iranian facilities and the White House cajoled Tehran and Tel Aviv into a ceasefire soon after.
It also appears that Trump, who has to consider the ‘Middle East fatigue’ and anti-war impulses of his MAGA base, has no desire to bring the United States into a direct or full-scale war with Iran.
On the other hand, his foreign policy is wildly pro-Israel, and if Tel Aviv resumes its strikes on Iran, one could easily imagine Trump allowing Washington to get dragged into a war in order to serve the interests of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet.
Q: How would you assess the Iranian government’s policy of engagement with countries around the world, including its neighbors, and what further effective steps do you think Iran could take in this area?
A: The June 2025 conflict with Israel appears to have further validated the strategic value of Iran’s recent efforts to reduce tensions and normalize relations with key regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, within the context of Tehran’s “Neighbors First” foreign policy doctrine.
Both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi—despite their past tensions with Tehran—publicly condemned Israeli aggression and chose not to participate in any hostile actions against Iran. This marked a notable departure from their previous posture during the first Trump administration, when both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were strong proponents of the so-called “maximum pressure” campaign against the Islamic Republic. Yet, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s restraint during the recent conflict has reinforced the importance of continued regional diplomacy and dialogue, particularly within the framework of efforts to promote de-escalation and dialogue among the different states of the Persian Gulf.
Iran is also expanding its strategic vision to include deeper geo-economic and diplomatic engagement with Central Asia. In the context of Iran’s growing partnership with China—especially around the Belt and Road Initiative and the development of alternative trade corridors that bypass the Strait of Hormuz—countries such as Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are becoming increasingly central to Iran’s regional calculus. This represents a notable shift from previous times, during which Central Asia remained relatively peripheral to Tehran’s foreign policy agenda.
Going forward, Iran could further enhance its regional and global engagement by continuing to prioritize pragmatic diplomacy over ideological rigidity, deepening multilateral cooperation through regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Economic Cooperation Organization, and investing in infrastructural and economic connectivity that links Iran more tightly with Central Asia, Pakistan, China, and other countries in Eurasia.
Such steps would not only strengthen Iran’s global standing but also help insulate the country from Western pressures by embedding it more firmly within emerging multipolar structures of economic and political influence.
Q: From your perspective, what is the significance of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s participation in regional and international organizations and unions, and how does this affect the country’s economy and security?
A: Iran’s active participation in non-Western organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS+ underscores Tehran’s strategic pivot toward deeper engagement with the Global South and Eurasian geopolitical and geo-economic frameworks.
These memberships reflect a broader effort by the Islamic Republic to recalibrate its foreign policy orientation, reducing dependence on Western-dominated systems and forging alternative paths for economic cooperation, political dialogue, and regional integration.
Iran’s inclusion in these multilateral bodies conveys an important message: Iran is not isolated and possesses viable partnerships beyond the Transatlantic sphere.
In the context of persistent Western sanctions and economic pressure, participation in the SCO and BRICS+ offers Tehran a diplomatic platform to pursue mutual interests with rising powers like China, Russia, and others who share a commitment to multipolarity and the rebalancing of global influence.
While the full economic impact of these memberships will depend on the implementation of concrete cooperation mechanisms and the easing of structural barriers, Iran’s presence in such organizations enhances its strategic depth and reinforces its sovereignty by signaling that it has credible options outside of Western frameworks. This, in turn, contributes to both economic resilience and national security by broadening Iran’s international partnerships and reducing its vulnerability to coercion by Washington and Tel Aviv.
