Iran’s Red Line in the Negotiations: Three Key Messages That Must Be Heard

According to the Politics Desk of Saed News, the Iran–U.S. negotiations that resumed on February 6 do not eliminate the risk of a potential military confrontation, and this diplomatic process could be halted at any moment.

At present, the most that can realistically be expected from these talks is a limited technical agreement, likely involving the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran’s nuclear facilities and a partial easing of sanctions. However, such an agreement would not amount to a full resolution of the Iran–U.S. crisis; it would merely moderate tensions for a limited period. Nevertheless, regardless of the outcome, the resumption of talks between Iran and the United States is a significant development.

The key point here is not the fact of “dialogue” itself, but the timing of the negotiations’ return—after direct Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iranian territory, explicit military threats, and a period during which both sides publicly questioned the usefulness of negotiations.

Three Messages of the Negotiations

The return of Iran–U.S. talks conveys three important messages:

First: Neither Washington nor Tehran considers a military scenario to be controllable or low-cost. While this option remains on the table, it is viewed as an undesirable alternative rather than a preferred path.

Second: The United States has effectively accepted that pressure and attacks cannot replace negotiations, while Iran has realized that demonstrations of resilience alone do not eliminate threats or escalation.

Third: These talks do not represent a return to normalcy, but rather an attempt to create a temporary pause—a test to determine whether any space still exists for an agreement, even in its most minimal form.

It is important to note that these negotiations are by no means a revival of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the original nuclear deal signed in 2015 and abandoned in 2018 under President Donald Trump. Instead, the talks are starting from scratch, but in a far more difficult and tense context. If illusions are set aside and the logic of both sides is considered, no successful Iran–U.S. agreement can be broad or historic. At best, it would be a limited, temporary, and technical deal that could conditionally be described as a “lite JCPOA.”

Possible Options for Both Sides

Potential options for Iran include:

1. Fixing uranium enrichment at a minimum level

2. The return of IAEA inspectors (with full or broad access)

3. Limiting or suspending the most sensitive parts of the nuclear infrastructure

4. Refusing to negotiate over Iran’s missile program, proxy forces, or regional policy

U.S. objectives include:

1. Narrowing the scope of sanctions with clear and specific goals

2. Releasing part of Iran’s assets under external supervision (based on the 2023 agreement model)

3. Establishing open humanitarian, food, and medical channels

4. Possibly offering informal or implicit guarantees to reduce tensions

The key point is that these negotiations are not a solution to the crisis, but merely a postponement of it. As Iranian experts have put it, this is “like prescribing aspirin to a cancer patient.” When all the signals are viewed together, a relatively clear picture emerges.

The “good start” mentioned by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi after the recent talks in Oman reflects a minimal, diplomatic formula. It simply means that the negotiation process was not immediately halted; the parties were able to present their positions without issuing ultimatums, and no dramatic walkout occurred. This does not, however, indicate a convergence of positions.

Araghchi’s statement that “frameworks can be shaped despite mistrust” means that Iran does not trust the United States but considers procedural and managed interaction possible. In other words, there is no trust, but there is an interest in crisis management.

Tehran’s Red Line

The foreign minister’s remarks that only the nuclear issue was discussed in the Muscat talks highlight Tehran’s red line—and show that it remains intact. This means Iran is not prepared to negotiate a “grand bargain,” and any U.S. attempt to expand the agenda could derail the talks. Accordingly, the current format is deliberately limited and focused.

In reality, the negotiations were conducted indirectly, with messages exchanged through Omani intermediaries. This reflects the depth of the crisis rather than its easing. Indirect talks indicate the absence of even minimal political trust and a desire to preserve the option of “reversibility.”

Key decision points remain in Tehran and Washington, where there is still room for serious adjustments in positions. News of another round of talks in the coming days signals urgency rather than optimism. Both sides understand that the window of opportunity is narrow, and that prolonging the process increases the risk of an incident that could rapidly push the situation toward conflict.

The presence of Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), at the Oman talks is one of the strongest signals in the entire negotiation process. As the official responsible for actual military operations, his presence indicates that negotiations are proceeding alongside real military planning—not instead of it. Through this, the United States signals to Iran that diplomacy is only one option, and that not only nuclear parameters but also informal red lines related to escalation may be under discussion.

The resumption of talks reduces the likelihood of an immediate conflict, but does not eliminate it. A temporary diplomatic window has opened, yet military plans remain in place, and any failure in negotiations could serve as a pretext for escalation. Domestic critics of the talks in Iran rightly point out the risk of U.S. bluffing. Moreover, the negotiation process could collapse at any moment due to provocation, unintended disclosures, internal crises, intervention by external actors (Israel or proxy forces), or a regional incident. Both sides believe they can navigate the crisis and both overestimate their ability to manage escalation.

U.S. Military Presence Alongside Negotiations

While negotiating with Iran, the United States is simultaneously reinforcing its military presence in the region in preparation for a potential large-scale attack—one that President Donald Trump warned Iran about in late January.

A U.S. naval group led by the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln is reportedly moving toward Iran. According to reports, accompanying U.S. warships are equipped with 450 Tomahawk cruise missiles. Gregory Lukyanov, a researcher at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, argues that the United States did not resume negotiations with Iran to achieve a fair peace based on compromise. Rather, under pressure from its regional allies—the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms—it agreed to talks in Oman. These countries are deeply concerned about a U.S.–Iran war, fearing it could plunge the entire Middle East into chaos.

The Russian scholar emphasizes that the Oman talks are focused solely on exchanging information, proposals, and key positions in two of the three priority areas identified by the United States: the nuclear and missile programs. Delegations exchange views and demands, but decisions will ultimately be made in Tehran and Washington.

The role of the delegations is merely to convey these positions to their leaders—this, in essence, defines the entire meaning of the negotiations. Lukyanov notes that the Iranian side is highly interested in reducing diplomatic tensions under the current circumstances, a fact reflected in the Iranian foreign minister’s statements. According to him, the United States is not seeking a comprehensive agreement, but rather aims to shape a new balance of power in the Middle East and drive a fundamental change in Iran’s foreign policy.