SAEDNEWS: Emerging unscathed from the recent Israel-Iran conflict, Gulf states—especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar—now find themselves in a powerful position to shape regional security, broker diplomatic influence, and extract strategic concessions from both warring sides.
According to Saed News, the unprecedented direct conflict between Israel and Iran has redrawn the contours of Middle Eastern geopolitics—not only on the battlefield but behind closed doors in the palaces and conference rooms of the Gulf. With their territory untouched, their oil exports flowing, and their diplomatic stature enhanced, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have emerged as unexpected winners in a war that exposed the vulnerabilities of both Tehran and Tel Aviv.
For years, Gulf leaders braced for a regional inferno, especially when under missile fire from Iranian allies like the Houthis in Yemen. But in a stark reversal, Saudi and Emirati rulers now watch smoke rise from Iranian cities while Israeli society wrestles with the psychological toll of sustained missile barrages. Not a single Gulf capital was hit.
“Israel showed bravery,” admitted one Arab official speaking to Middle East Eye (MEE), “but its home front crumbled under two weeks of pressure.” The comment reflected a broader regional analysis circulating within Arab capitals: while Israel demonstrated air superiority, Iran proved it could strike back with force, breaking the long-standing illusion of Israeli invincibility.
This conflict—marked by the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, and Iranian retaliatory missile strikes on Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the al-Udeid base in Qatar—was the first full-scale, conventional war between the two regional powers. Arab states, for the first time in decades, observed both combatants’ limitations up close.
“The image of an Israel with flawless air defences has cracked,” noted Bader al-Saif of Kuwait University. This, he suggested, strengthens Arab negotiating power with Israel, including for countries like the UAE and Bahrain that normalized ties under the Abraham Accords.
Yet Gulf calculations extend beyond Israel. With Iran's nuclear programme “badly damaged,” as Tehran itself concedes, and its military command shaken, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are eyeing deeper engagement with the Islamic Republic. The Saudi Defence Minister—Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s own brother—visited Tehran in April. High-level diplomatic visits and economic overtures are expected in the coming months.
“The Gulf gets a hearing in Washington,” one Arab diplomat emphasized. “That remains their leverage with Iran—being able to call Trump in the middle of the night and get an answer.”
Indeed, Gulf influence in Washington appears to have grown. During President Trump’s May visit, the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia secured over $100 billion in deals. Under Saudi pressure, Trump refrained from authorizing U.S. strikes on the Houthis, and even lifted sanctions on Syria.
As the war intensified, Gulf capitals resisted Israeli appeals to join in. Officials from all three major Gulf states told MEE that they had lobbied the United States privately to push for a ceasefire. Despite historical animosity, “there is more sympathy with Iran now among the ruling class than at any point in recent memory,” noted former U.S. ambassador Patrick Theros.
This pivot is rooted not only in strategic calculus but also in changing social and political currents. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s liberalizing reforms—including curbing hardline clerics and “de-Wahhabising” Saudi Arabia—have muted anti-Shia rhetoric and undercut the ideological fervor that once fed hostility toward Iran.
The new regional order has economic undertones. With an eye on diversification, Gulf states are pursuing megaprojects like Red Sea luxury tourism and AI infrastructure. For them, stability—not ideological confrontation—is now paramount.
This orientation has also shifted public sentiment. A Washington Institute poll found 96% of Saudis oppose normalization with Israel amid its war on Gaza, which has claimed more than 56,000 Palestinian lives. Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia all condemned Israel’s strikes on Iran, and pressure for de-escalation continues to mount.
Even among prior Israeli allies, the war has chilled prospects of normalization. Trump—keen to secure diplomatic wins—was reportedly discouraged by Saudi Arabia from pushing for a deal with Israel during his Riyadh visit. The Saudis now demand “irreversible steps” toward Palestinian statehood before any agreement. And according to diplomats, “the price has gone up” since the Israel-Iran war.
“There’s a very good sense in Riyadh of where the Arab street stands,” one Gulf official told MEE. “Saudi Arabia will insist on something serious.”
The Gulf’s quiet resilience and deft diplomacy during this crisis have elevated its stature—no longer just energy giants or security dependents, but now central brokers in the Middle East’s unfolding power struggle. As Iran and Israel nurse their wounds, the Gulf is already cashing in.
